When the KGB was disbanded. State Security Committee of the USSR

V.I. Lenin and the first chairman of the Cheka, F. Dzerzhinsky, created this state institution as a “combat detachment of the party,” that is, as a party-state intelligence service with a clear ideological orientation towards a decisive struggle against political and ideological opponents.

The extreme conditions of counter-revolutionary opposition to the power of the Bolsheviks, the unfolding civil war and foreign intervention justified such a basis for the creation of the special services of the Soviet state. The Cheka, and then the GPU and OGPU acted decisively and offensively, skillfully seizing the initiative from their opponents, who were much more experienced. The personnel of the security agencies of the RSFSR, and later the USSR, were, without a doubt, deeply devoted to communist ideas. And although the general educational level of most of the management, not to mention the operational staff, was low, a clear political line, revolutionary pathos, a sense of exclusivity instilled in the security officers from the first day of service, made the Soviet state security agencies for 10-12 years one of the most powerful intelligence services in the world.

State security agencies have undergone more than ten reorganizations since their creation, with half of them occurring in the period 1991-1994.

The original name is known to everyone - it is the Cheka (1917). After the end of the civil war in 1922, a new abbreviation appeared - GPU. Following the formation of the USSR, the United GPU (OGPU USSR) arose on its basis. In 1934, the OGPU was merged with the internal affairs bodies (police) and the Union-Republican People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was formed. G. Yagoda became People's Commissar, then N. Yezhov. L. Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1938. In February 1941, the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was separated from this united structure as an independent one. In July 1941, he was again returned to the NKVD, and in 1943 he was again separated for many years into an independent structure - the NKGB, renamed in 1946 into the Ministry of State Security. Since 1943 it was headed by V. Merkulov.

After Stalin's death, Beria once again united the internal affairs bodies and state security bodies into a single ministry - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and headed it himself. Then S. Kruglov became the Minister of Internal Affairs.

In March 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created, separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I. Serov was appointed its chairman. In this post he was successively replaced by A. Shelepin, V. Semichastny, Yu. Andropov (he was in this position for about 15 years), V. Fedorchuk, V. Chebrikov, V. Kryuchkov, L. Shebarshin, V. Bakatin.

Appointed after August 1991 to the post of Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, V. Bakatin developed and began to implement the concept of disintegration of the KGB, i.e. fragmenting it into a number of independent departments in order to deprive it of its monopoly in the sphere of ensuring state security of the country. From the KGB, the Security Directorate, the Foreign Intelligence Service, FAPSI, Border Troops, and special-purpose divisions were transferred to the jurisdiction of the President.

After such “transformations,” the KGB of the USSR ceased to exist and from November 1991 began to be called the Inter-Republican Security Service (MSB USSR).

Throughout all 74 years of its existence, organs. The Cheka-KGB were a unique state organization, and their activities were comprehensive both in terms of the level of tasks they solved and in covering almost all spheres of life of the state and society. The bodies of the Cheka-KGB in the Center and locally, along with the CPSU and the Soviet system, were one of the three structural components of the Soviet state and social system. The rigid hierarchy of the KGB bodies, control, carried out along with party bodies, over the Armed Forces, the country's economy, national and cultural policies, foreign personnel, etc. made the State Security Committee a super-special service that had no analogues in the world before.

Naturally, the exceptional position in the state and society, the ability to quickly concentrate the enormous potential, if necessary, of the entire society, to solve the problems set by the leadership of the party, made the organs of the Cheka-KGB an extremely effective system, especially in extreme situations - during war years and aggravation of social tension . Thus, it was L. Beria, using the state security agencies, who mobilized the country’s enormous resources to create atomic weapons in the shortest possible time.

The Cheka-KGB system was truly a phenomenon. The thing is. that the KGB was a unique complex of intelligence services. The USSR State Security Committee included foreign intelligence (First Main Directorate), counterintelligence (Second Main Directorate), military counterintelligence (Third Main Directorate), transport and communications security (Fourth Directorate), economic counterintelligence (Sixth Directorate), ideological counterintelligence and political investigation (Department "3"), the fight against organized crime (Department for Combating Organized Crime), protection of the top leadership of the USSR and the CPSU (Security Service), border guards (Main Directorate of Border Troops), special troops (Main Directorate of Special Forces), ensuring government communications (Government Communications Department), encryption service (Eighth Main Directorate), decryption and radio interception service (Sixteenth Main Directorate), etc. The total number of KGB troops and agencies in 1991 reached about 420 thousand people.

This gigantic mechanism made it possible to quickly maneuver forces and concentrate them on the most important areas of work at the moment, reduce financial and material costs, and avoid duplication. This structure of the KGB ensured the acquisition of important information from various sources, its effective cross-checking, comprehensive analysis and synthesis, although, of course, it turned the committee to a large extent into a monopolist supplier of the most important information for the leadership of the USSR. The absence of interdepartmental barriers between intelligence, counterintelligence and other services ensured the rapid coordination, development and successful implementation of complex long-term operations. This significantly increased the effectiveness of the KGB’s activities compared to the US intelligence services.

The activities of the KGB bodies were based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Today, many view this circumstance solely as a negative one that contributed to the disappearance of this super-special service. However, we must remember that for many decades it was the communist ideology that was the strongest weapon of the Cheka-KGB. Most of the most valuable agents abroad began to work with the security officers for ideological reasons, sincerely believing in the messianic ideals of creating a just society and international peace. It is enough to name the third man of British intelligence, K. Philby, and O. Ames, the head of the sector of counterintelligence operations against the USSR of the CIA, recruited by the KGB in the mid-80s. And there were hundreds and thousands of such employees of foreign intelligence services, ministers, politicians, prominent diplomats and officials, officers and generals, professors and students who decided to fight against imperialism for social justice and linked their lives with the KGB. While traitors and defectors from among the employees of the USSR state security agencies, as a rule, made their choice because of other, far from ideological, considerations.

It is noteworthy that when, from the mid-70s, the system of party bodies, headed by the elderly Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, began to lose authority among the people, many ordinary people turned their gaze to the KGB. It is not for nothing that even the ardent opponent of this organization, Academician A. Sakharov, considered it the least corrupt. And indeed, since 1975, the KGB received more letters with complaints, requests and proposals than the main power structure of the USSR - the CPSU Central Committee. Moreover, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that not a single one of these letters went unnoticed; many found their resolution. Work with workers' letters was constantly in the field of view of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu. Andropov, who created a special department responsible for this activity.

At the same time, in recent years the KGB, as a giant conglomerate of intelligence agencies, has become increasingly difficult to manage. The Chairman of the KGB practically became the third figure in terms of the level of his influence after the President (aka General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) and the Prime Minister of the USSR, and in terms of the volume of real power - the second person in the state.

It was not for nothing that KGB Chairman Yu. Andropov was able to quickly and effectively inherit the power of L. Brezhnev. It was in the KGB, earlier than in other government structures, that an understanding of the need for reform arose. And, of course, it must be said that the chief of state security, V. Kryuchkov, and his subordinates, more acutely than others, realized the terrible danger of the collapse of the USSR and the coming innumerable disasters for its peoples. That is why they took an active part in organizing the attempt to save the country in August 1991. However, it was too late: the process of disintegration of the CPSU, the entire power structure in the USSR, including the KGB, had gone too far.

The main principle of the activities of the Cheka-KGB bodies throughout their history was the principle of party leadership. These special services have never, under any circumstances, played an independent political role and have always been the obedient, sharpest tool of the CPSU. It was the connection of the KGB with the party structures of power that contributed to the growth of the power and influence of this special service, but, on the other hand, led the KGB to disintegration as it weakened, internally degraded and, finally, collapsed the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The strong features of the KGB were the strict centralization and comprehensive nature of the structures of this special service, covering many areas of security, economy of forces and resources, lack of duplication of links, corporatism, elite personnel, direct integration into the system of the highest political and state leadership of the country, and hence a clear political and ideological orientation of activity.

In March 1954, operational units were separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. ensuring the state security of the country. On their basis, an independent department was established - the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the rights of a Union-Republican ministry. For the KGB bodies, a system of their construction, functioning, accountability and control was chosen that would in fact abolish their over-centralization and fit them into the constitutional system of government of the USSR to the maximum extent possible.

The very new name of the KGB bodies - the State Security Committee - clearly meant that the most important problems of their organization and activities should be resolved on a collegial basis. For these purposes, the KGB established a Collegium, which in its legal status differed significantly from the collegiums of other ministries and departments. If the collegiums of ministries were advisory bodies under the relevant ministers, then the KGB collegium was created as a decisive body. The provision on it provided that in those hypothetical cases when the KGB chairman finds himself in the minority during a vote, the issue under consideration should be automatically and immediately transferred to higher authorities. Such a procedure was envisaged as an effective guarantee and measure to prevent various kinds of voluntaristic tendencies in the KGB system. Collegial units (colleges and councils) were also created in local KGB bodies (up to and including the KGB departments of territories and regions).

The disadvantages of organizing the functioning of the State Security Committee include a strict relationship with the structures of the CPSU, a monopoly in the field of security in general and information support for the country's top leadership, the lack of real mechanisms of civilian control over the activities of the KGB, the complexity of managing this gigantic intelligence service and the inability to quickly transform depending on drastic changes. changes in the political and operational environment, lack of real competition. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which occupied a specific niche and operated largely under the control of the KGB through military counterintelligence. Therefore, it would be wrong to consider the KGB and GRU as competitors.

Of course, some characteristic features, depending on the situation, can carry both a positive and a negative load, so the assessments given above can be considered to a certain extent subjective.

Perhaps something else is important: in general, the KGB as a special service, in its structure, functions, personnel composition and, most importantly, place in the system of state institutions, was extremely consistent with the mechanisms of state-political power in the Soviet Union. The degradation and collapse of this system inevitably led to the collapse of the KGB. This was the strategic vulnerability of the State Security Committee of the USSR - the most powerful intelligence service in the world, an analogue of which is unlikely to appear in the foreseeable future in the post-Soviet space. A strong state - the USSR - corresponded to a strong special service of the KGB, which died along with this state.

After a long series of reorganizations through the GPU - OGPU - NKVD - NKGB - MGB - Ministry of Internal Affairs, the security agencies were transformed into the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

According to the then existing order, an important political decision on the separation of state security structures from the Ministry of Internal Affairs into an independent department was made by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on February 8, 1954, based on a note by the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs S.N. Kruglov.

It, in particular, noted that the Ministry of Internal Affairs “... is not able to provide the proper level of intelligence and operational work in the light of the tasks assigned to Soviet intelligence by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government,” and in this regard contained a proposal to allocate operational security units departments and departments - in total there were 16 of them out of 40 structural divisions of the ministry - and on their basis to form a Committee for State Security Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Let us immediately note that as a result of the reforms carried out in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 directorates and independent departments remained.

In the process of reforming the state security agencies, Kruglov also proposed to reduce the number of their operational staff by 20%, which was supposed to be 15,956 staff units, and which was supposed to give annual savings of 346 million rubles. But in general, taking into account the reduction in the number of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (by 8,839 staff units), the reform promised savings in the amount of 860 million rubles.

The given figures suggest that by February 1954 the number of state security agencies, excluding border troops, was about 80 thousand people.
Based on the results of the discussion of this memorandum and taking into account the proposals and comments made during it, on March 13, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree on the formation of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the 51-year-old Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General I. A. Serov, who began serving in the state security agencies in July 1939.

By order of the KGB chairman dated March 18, 1954, the structure of the new department was determined, in which, in addition to auxiliary and support units, the following were formed:

First Main Directorate (PGU, intelligence abroad);

Second Main Directorate (VSU, counterintelligence);

Third Main Directorate (military counterintelligence);

Eighth Main Directorate (encryption-decryption);

Fourth Directorate (fight against the anti-Soviet underground, nationalist formations and hostile elements);

Fifth Directorate (counterintelligence work at particularly important facilities);

Sixth Directorate (Transport);

Seventh Directorate (external surveillance);

Ninth Directorate (protection of party and government leaders);

Tenth Directorate (directorate of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin);

The Investigation Department, as well as 5 independent special departments, the department (hereinafter referred to as the department) of government communications and the accounting and archival department.

In general, this structure reveals the tasks and functions of the new Union-Republican department.

April 2, 1957 The KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR transferred border troops from the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and created the Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV) to manage them.

In June, an All-Union meeting of senior KGB officials was held, at which the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev delivered a keynote speech.

According to the decision of the CPSU Central Committee, among the tasks of the KGB the following was formulated: “In the shortest possible time, eliminate the consequences of Beria’s enemy activities and achieve the transformation of the state security organs into a sharp weapon of our party, directed against the real enemies of our socialist state, and not against honest people.” This was due to the identification of facts of violation of the law in the activities of the MGB-MVD in 1946-1953.

Let us also note the fact that in 1953, for the last time, a decision was made “in a special order” on the administrative expulsion of family members of former minister L.P. Beria and persons involved in his criminal case (in total, 54 people). After this, the Special Meeting (OSO) under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was abolished on September 1, 1953.

It should also be immediately and especially emphasized that serious criticism of the activities of state security agencies, begun in a special secret report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, had the most serious and direct impact on the formation, staffing and activities of the KGB bodies, however, it had both positive and significant negative consequences.

It is known that N.S. Khrushchev repeatedly officially stated that “the state security agencies got out of the control of the party and placed themselves above the party,” which does not fully correspond to the historical truth. Nowadays, this historical myth is convincingly dispelled by the recently published collection of documents “Stalin and the Cheka-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. January 1922-December 1936” (M., 2003).

Under the slogan “to exclude the possibility of a return to 1937,” state security agencies, in violation of the constitutional principle of equality of all citizens before the law, the CPSU Central Committee were prohibited from collecting incriminating materials on representatives of the party-Soviet and trade union nomenklatura. According to many researchers, this erroneous and illegal political decision of 1956 marked the beginning of corruption and the emergence of organized crime in our country, because it removed significant contingents of persons with administrative, control and economic powers from the control of law enforcement agencies, including including the KGB of the USSR. At the same time, this made it easier for foreign intelligence services to attempt recruiting approaches and operational development of party and state functionaries of various ranks, as a result of which the country's leading elite found itself without proper counterintelligence cover from the intelligence and subversive influence of the intelligence services of foreign states. And in totality, this decision had the most negative consequences for the fate of the country and the Soviet state.

In paragraph 1 of the Regulations on the KGB and its local bodies, approved by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on January 9, 1954, it was emphasized that state security bodies “... are political bodies that carry out activities of the Communist Party and the Government to protect the Socialist state from attacks by on the part of external and internal enemies, as well as to protect the state border of the USSR. They are called upon to vigilantly monitor the secret machinations of the enemies of the Soviet country, expose their plans, and suppress the criminal activities of imperialist intelligence services against the Soviet state...

The State Security Committee works under the direct leadership and control of the Central Committee of the CPSU."

In paragraph 11 of the section “Personnel of state security bodies and troops” of the Regulations it was noted: “Employees of state security bodies must be educated in the spirit of a merciless fight against the enemies of our Motherland, the ability to prevent crimes, fulfill their official duty, sparing their strength, while showing determination and initiative. There should be no place for careerists, sycophants and reinsurers in state security agencies."

Paragraph 12 emphasized “State security agencies are obliged, directly and through relevant organizations, to take preventive measures against those Soviet citizens who commit politically incorrect actions due to their insufficient political maturity.

Supervision of the investigation in the state security agencies is carried out by the Prosecutor General of the USSR and the prosecutors subordinate to him in accordance with the Regulations on prosecutorial supervision in the USSR."

The leaders and party organizations of the KGB bodies and troops pledged to educate their employees “... in the spirit of party integrity, selfless devotion to the Communist Party and the socialist Motherland, in the spirit of vigilance, an honest attitude to business and the strictest adherence to socialist legality.
Party organizations carry out party-political and organizational work and ensure the development of business criticism and self-criticism. Party organizations and every communist have the right, guided by the statutes of the CPSU, to report shortcomings in the work of state security bodies to the relevant party bodies."

This provision was in effect until May 16, 1991, when the law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” was adopted.

According to an established tradition, the formation of staff of state security organs was carried out on the recommendation of party or Komsomol organizations of enterprises, military units or universities after their verification and careful study, or by “party recruitment”, that is, the direction of party workers to, as a rule, leadership positions after the appropriate short-term training.

Since 1954, training of employees was carried out at the Higher School of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became a higher educational institution with a three-year period of study.

Despite the fact that the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev looked at the state security agencies with obvious suspicion, I.A. Serov, for the first time in the post-war years, managed to achieve the assignment of general ranks to 10 KGB employees in May 1954.

At the same time, there was a process of checking the entire personnel of the KGB bodies for involvement in the violations of the law that had taken place - often such facts were revealed in the process of reviewing archival criminal cases based on statements from citizens and requests for rehabilitation.

As I.A. Serov reported to the CPSU Central Committee in 1957, since the formation of the KGB, more than 18 thousand people have been dismissed “from the organs,” including “more than 2,300 employees for violations of socialist legality, abuse of official position and official misconduct. About 200 people were dismissed from the KGB Central Office, 40 were stripped of their general ranks." He also noted that, compared to 1954, the number of KGB personnel was reduced by more than 50%, and in 1955 the number of personnel was further reduced by 7,678 units and 7,800 officers were transferred to the position of workers and employees.

On this occasion, in one of his speeches in February 1959, N.S. Khrushchev noted that “we... have significantly reduced our state security agencies, and we are still aiming to reduce them.”

In a note to the CPSU Central Committee following the results of the KGB work in June 1957, I.A. Serov also noted that 2,508 information messages received from PSU residencies abroad were sent to the CPSU Central Committee (N.S. Khrushchev), 2,316 messages were sent to the Council of Ministers, and intelligence information was also sent to the department of the CPSU Central Committee for external relations, to the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, foreign trade, medium engineering and health care. Behind these dry numbers lies the daily painstaking and dangerous work of Soviet intelligence officers.

In April 1959, A.N. Shelepin, who became the chairman of the KGB, proposed reducing the staff of operational workers in the center and locally by another 3,200 units, and the staff of workers and employees by 8,500 people.

It should be noted that such a protracted campaign of “purges” and reductions in the state security agencies did not have the best effect on both the results of work and the state of the moral and psychological climate in security officers’ teams, giving rise to feelings of insecurity among employees, underestimating the importance and necessity of work to ensure security of the state and its citizens.

It should be emphasized that with the introduction of the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR and the Union republics, the jurisdiction, that is, the competence of the KGB bodies under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, included work on 15 elements of especially dangerous and other state crimes, including treason Homeland, espionage, disclosure of state secrets and loss of documents containing state secrets, terrorist acts, sabotage, sabotage, illegal crossing of the state border, smuggling, illegal currency transactions, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, organizational anti-Soviet activities.

In February 1960, by resolution of the Council of Ministers, the 4th, 5th and 6th departments were abolished, and their functions were transferred to the VGU KGB (it, and in fact, the entire counterintelligence of the country from the formation of the KGB until its abolition was successively headed by P.V. Fedotov, O.M.Gribanov, S.G.Bannikov, G.K.Tsinev, G.F. Grigorenko, I.A.Markelov, V.F.Grushko). At the same time, under the chairman of the KGB, a Group was organized to study and summarize the experience of security agencies and data on the enemy with a staff of 10 people, which became the backbone of the future Analytical Directorate (created in 1990).

In a speech in October 1961 At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Shelepin stated that “The state security bodies have been reorganized, significantly reduced, freed from functions unusual for them, cleared of careerist elements. All activities of the KGB bodies are now under the constant control of the Party and the Government, built on complete trust in the Soviet people, on respect for his rights and dignity... State security bodies are no longer the scarecrow that their enemies - Beria and his henchmen - tried to make them in the recent past, but truly popular political bodies of our party in the literal sense of the word."

May 18, 1967 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the Central Committee department for relations with communist and workers' parties of socialist countries, Yu.V., was appointed to the post of Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Andropov. On July 17 of the same year, on the initiative of the KGB, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided to create an independent 5th department within the committee structure to combat ideological sabotage of the enemy, and its supervisor along the leadership line was First Deputy Chairman of the KGB S.K. Tsvigun. In a note to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the issue of creating a new department by Yu.V. Andropov, in particular, it was noted that if in March 1954 there were 25,375 employees working in the KGB counterintelligence units, then in June 1967 there were only 14,263 people. In this regard, the new KGB chairman asked to increase the committee's staff by 2,250 units, including 1,750 officer and 500 civilian positions. According to Order No. 0096 of July 27, 1967, the staff of the newly formed 5th Directorate of the KGB amounted to 201 official units.

This is how Yu.V. Andropov informed the CPSU Central Committee about the results of the KGB’s work in 1967 (No. 1025-A/OV dated May 6, 1968). Since this document allows us to get a general idea of ​​both the main directions and tasks of the security agencies in that period, and the scope of their work, we present a number of excerpts from it.

In particular, the KGB chairman emphasized:

"...The main attention of the KGB bodies was focused on strengthening, first of all, foreign policy intelligence, so that it would actively contribute to the successful implementation of Soviet foreign policy and reliably ensure the timely identification, disruption and exposure of subversive plans of imperialist states and their intelligence centers..." .

In total, the KGB residencies received 25,645 information materials, and another 7,290 materials were received through the exchange of materials from the intelligence services of socialist states. (The most powerful and effective special services in the 70s-80s were considered to be the intelligence services of the German Democratic Republic (Directorate “A” of the GDR MGB), as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland).

Based on the materials received by the PGU of the KGB of the USSR, 4,260 information messages were sent to the CPSU Central Committee, an additional 4,728 messages were sent to the linear functional departments of the CPSU Central Committee, 4,832 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4,639 to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU. Additionally, 42 foreign policy bulletins were sent to members of the Politburo intelligence information.

In addition, 1,495 information, 9,910 materials and 1,403 samples of equipment were sent to various ministries and departments of the USSR; 1,376 works on 210 topics and more than 330 samples of equipment were obtained on instructions from the Military-Industrial Commission.

Through counterintelligence, “among the employees of diplomatic missions and tourists, businessmen, and members of various delegations coming to the USSR (in 1967 there were over 250 thousand people), 270 foreigners were identified suspected of involvement in the enemy’s special services. For intelligence activities, carrying out actions ideological sabotage, smuggling, illegal currency activities and violation of norms of behavior, 108 foreigners were expelled from the USSR and 11 foreigners were prosecuted.

The military counterintelligence apparatus of the KGB, together with the security agencies of the GDR, exposed 17 Western intelligence agents who carried out espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Based on the fact that the enemy, in his calculations to undermine socialism from within, places a large stake on the propaganda of nationalism, the KGB carried out a number of measures to suppress attempts to carry out organized nationalist activities in a number of regions of the country...

In 1967, the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet documents was registered on the territory of the USSR... The KGB authorities identified 1,198 anonymous authors. Most of them took this path due to their political immaturity, as well as due to the lack of proper educational work in the teams where they work or study. At the same time, individual hostile elements used this path to fight Soviet power. Due to the increased number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents due to their hostile convictions, the number of people prosecuted for this type of crime also increased: in 1966 there were 41, and in 1967 - 114 people...

Characterizing the state of operational records of the KGB bodies, it should be noted that in quantitative terms they continue to decline, although to an insignificant extent. According to data as of January 1 of this year. Counterintelligence apparatuses are investigating 1,068 people, searching for 2,293 people, and monitoring 6,747 people.

In 1967, the KGB brought 738 people to criminal responsibility, of which 263 people were for especially dangerous and 475 for other state crimes. Among those prosecuted were 3 people who committed sabotage, 121 people were traitors and punishers during the Nazi occupation, 34 people were accused of treason and attempted treason, 96 people were accused of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 people were accused of illegal crossing. border, 100 people - in theft of state and public property on a large scale and bribery, 148 people - in smuggling and violating the rules on currency transactions, one foreigner and one Soviet citizen were arrested for espionage...

The investigative apparatus of the KGB reviewed 6,732 archival criminal cases involving 12,376 people based on applications from citizens; in 3,783 cases, conclusions were made on their termination. Great importance was attached to preventive measures aimed at preventing state crimes. In 1967, the KGB authorities prevented 12,115 people, most of whom allowed manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful nature without hostile intent...

In 1967, checkpoints of border troops and investigative apparatus of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency traders about 30 kg of gold in bars and coins, products made of precious metals and stones, foreign currency and various goods totaling 2 million 645 thousand rubles.
...11,103 people were accepted to work in the agencies and to serve in the KGB troops, of which 4,502 were accepted into officer positions. At the same time, 6,582 people were dismissed, of which 2,102 were officers. The Chekist cadres were replenished in the reporting year by 470 workers who arrived from party, Komsomol and Soviet work.

In 1967, 17 people remained abroad; It was also not possible to prevent 3 cases of treason against the Motherland by military personnel of the Soviet Army."

This form and structure of reports to the “instance”, as the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were called in professional language, was preserved in the future, supplemented by new blocks of information on newly opened areas of operational work and with the formation of other structural divisions of state security bodies.

The creation of the latter was associated both with changes in the operational situation in the country and at the interstate level, as well as with the setting by the country’s leadership of additional tasks for the KGB.

According to the established tradition at that time, such organizational and staffing decisions were made by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by resolutions of the Council of Ministers, followed by an order from the KGB chairman.

On November 26, 1969, the “KGB Bureau of Communications with Publishing Houses and Other Media” was formed, more often called the “KGB Press Bureau”, in May 1990 it was transformed into the Public Relations Center with a significant expansion of its functions and a change in working methods.

On March 13, 1969, the 15th Directorate was created, the main task of which was “to ensure constant readiness for the immediate reception of those being sheltered (by the Soviet leadership - O.Kh.) in protected points (objects) and the creation in them of the conditions necessary for normal work in a special period".

One extremely important circumstance should also be noted. On December 25, 1972, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree “On the use of warnings by state security agencies as a preventive measure” (somewhat later, a similar decree on issuing an official warning was adopted in relation to the prosecutor’s office).

During such a conversation, a reasoned conclusion on the announcement of an official warning was announced to the person being prevented. If a citizen refused to sign the conclusion, a protocol was drawn up announcing a warning to him. The person being prevented was also informed that this conclusion, together with the protocol of announcing an official warning, would be transferred to the prosecutor's office and, if he was brought to criminal responsibility for such actions, would have the force of procedural evidence of the repeated commission of the illegal acts charged against him. On the one hand, this procedure had a serious deterrent effect on the person being prevented, on the other hand, it gave him the right to appeal the warning issued to the prosecutor's office.

For all its importance and relevance, this legislative act had one extremely important drawback, namely: for a reason that is difficult to explain, it was marked “Not for publication,” which significantly reduced the effectiveness of its preventive impact. In this regard, this Decree, as well as instructions for its application, were announced by order of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 0150 of March 23, 1973.

Unfortunately, after the reorganization of security agencies in 1992, their preventive work has no legislative regulation at all, which has the most negative impact on both its effectiveness, content, and scope.

Further reorganization of the KGB of the USSR was carried out in the direction of consolidation and strengthening of some counterintelligence units - the Second Main Directorate - by transforming them into independent departments (in total, by 1980 there were 17 departments in its structure).

In September 1981, Directorate "T" of the 2nd Main Directorate, which carried out counterintelligence work to ensure the security of the country's transport industries, was transformed into an independent 4th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

In May 1982, Yu.V. Andropov was elected Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and V.V. Fedorchuk became the new chairman of the KGB.

On October 15 of the same year, the 6th department was formed to protect the economy. Previously, since 1967, this task was solved by the 9th, 19th and 11th departments of the Voronezh State University, and since September 1980 - by the “P” Directorate as part of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

By a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 11, 1989, the 5th Directorate was transformed into the Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate “Z”) of the KGB of the USSR.

In December 1990, the last major reorganization took place in the KGB - a department for combating organized crime was formed - the "OP" Directorate.

Since the activities of the former 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR have aroused and continue to arouse constant and justified interest, it seems appropriate to dwell on this issue in more detail.

In a note to the CPSU Central Committee on the advisability of forming an independent administration to combat the ideological sabotage of the enemy No. 1631-A dated July 3, 1967, Yu.V. Andropov emphasized: “the materials available in the State Security Committee indicate that the reactionary forces of the imperialist camp, led by the ruling circles of the United States, are constantly increasing their efforts to intensify subversive actions against the Soviet Union.

At the same time, they consider psychological warfare one of the most important elements of the overall system of fighting communism...

The enemy seeks to transfer the planned operations on the ideological front directly to the territory of the USSR, aiming not only at the ideological disintegration of Soviet society, but also at creating conditions for acquiring sources of political information in our country.

In 1965-1966 State security agencies in a number of republics uncovered about 50 nationalist groups, which included over 500 people. In Moscow, Leningrad and some other places, anti-Soviet groups were exposed, whose participants in the so-called program documents declared the ideas of political restoration...

Under the influence of an ideology alien to us, some politically immature Soviet citizens, especially among the intelligentsia and youth, develop a mood of apoliticality and nihilism, which can be used not only by obviously anti-Soviet elements, but also by political talkers and demagogues, pushing such people to politically harmful actions. .."

In this regard, it was proposed to create an independent department (fifth) in the central apparatus of the KGB, assigning to it the following functions:

Organization of work to identify and study processes that could be used by the enemy for the purposes of ideological sabotage;

Identification and suppression of hostile activities of anti-Soviet, nationalist and church-sectarian elements, as well as prevention (together with the bodies of the Ministry of Human Rights) of mass riots;

Developments in contact with the intelligence of enemy ideological centers, anti-Soviet emigrant and nationalist organizations abroad;

Organization of counterintelligence work among foreign students studying in the USSR, as well as among foreign delegations and teams entering the USSR through the Ministry of Culture and Creative Organizations.

This note was considered by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on July 17, 1967 and the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was approved, which was adopted on the same day (No. 676-222 of July 17, 1967).

As noted in Andropov’s note to the CPSU Central Committee dated April 17, 1968, “On the tasks of state security agencies to combat the enemy’s ideological sabotage,” in contrast to previously operating similar units (secret political departments, 4th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - KGB), newly created units in the center and locally are called upon to fight ideological sabotage inspired by opponents of the USSR from abroad.

As noted in the decision of one of the Boards of the KGB of the USSR in 1968, in the work against ideological sabotage “one should proceed from the fact that the result of preventive work should be the prevention of crimes, the re-education of a person, the elimination of the causes that give rise to politically harmful manifestations. Objectives of the struggle "against the enemy's ideological sabotage will be resolved in close contact with party bodies at the center and locally, under their direct leadership and control."

Based on this resolution of the Council of Ministers, order No. 0096 of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR was issued on July 25, announcing the structure and staff of the established administration.

Initially, 6 departments were formed in the 5th department and their functions were as follows:

1st department - counterintelligence work on cultural exchange channels, development of foreigners, work through creative unions, research institutes, cultural institutions and medical institutions;

2nd department - planning and implementation of counterintelligence activities together with the PSU against the centers of ideological sabotage of imperialist states, suppression of the activities of the NTS, nationalist and chauvinist elements;

3rd department - counterintelligence work on the student exchange channel, suppression of hostile activities of students and teaching staff;

4th department - counterintelligence work among religious, Zionist and sectarian elements and against foreign religious centers;

5th department - practical assistance to local KGB bodies to prevent mass antisocial manifestations; search for the authors of anti-Soviet anonymous documents and leaflets; verification of terror signals;

6th department - generalization and analysis of data on enemy activities to carry out ideological sabotage; development of activities for long-term planning and information work.

In addition to the listed departments, the department's staff included a secretariat, a financial department, a personnel group and a mobilization work group, and the initial total number of its employees was 201 people.
The heads of the department during the period of its existence were A.F. Kadyshev, F.D. Bobkov, I.P. Abramov, E.F. Ivanov, who later also became the first head of the department "Z" ("Protection of the constitutional order") of the KGB of the USSR .

In August 1969, the 7th department was formed, into which the functions of identifying the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents containing terrorist threats, as well as the prompt development and prevention of hostile activities of persons harboring terrorist intentions were transferred from the 5th department.

In June 1973, the 8th department was formed to combat the subversive activities of foreign Zionist centers, and the following year - the 9th (development of anti-Soviet groups with connections to foreign centers of ideological sabotage) and 10th departments. The latter, together with the PSU, dealt with issues of penetration, identifying the plans of foreign intelligence services and centers and paralyzing their activities.

In June 1977, on the eve of the XX Olympic Games in Moscow, the 11th department was created, designed to carry out “operational security measures to disrupt the ideological actions of the enemy and hostile elements.” This department closely contacted its work with the 11th department of the Voronezh State University, which was also involved in the fight against international terrorism.

The 12th Department of the 5th Directorate was entrusted with the task of ensuring the security of mass public events in Moscow - festivals, forums, etc.

In February 1982, Department 13 was formed to identify and suppress “negative processes that tend to develop into politically harmful manifestations,” including the study of unhealthy youth groups - mystical, occult, pro-fascist, rockers, punks, football “fans” and similar.

Department 14 was involved in preventing acts of ideological sabotage aimed at journalists, media employees, and socio-political organizations.

In connection with the formation of new departments, the management staff increased to 424 people by 1982.

In total, as F.D. Bobkov recalled, 2.5 thousand employees served in the 5th Directorate in the USSR. On average, 10 people worked in the 5th service or department in the region. The intelligence apparatus was also optimal, with an average of 200 agents per region.

Since the formation of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on March 13, 1954, control over its activities was carried out by the Central Committee of the CPSU (in particular, the Department of Administrative Bodies, which received all complaints and statements of citizens regarding the actions of KGB officers addressed to party authorities, and which organized them verification and consideration), the Council of Ministers and the Prosecutor General's Office of the USSR, as well as some other government bodies, for example, the Ministry of Finance.

In connection with the reorganization of the entire state system of the USSR in 1989, the right to control the activities of the KGB was also granted to the Supreme Council of the USSR, both directly and through its Committee on Defense and State Security, as well as the Committee of Constitutional Supervision, which represented extremely important innovations legal nature.

In his subsequent interviews with media representatives and other public appearances, the KGB chairman clarified the characteristics of the goals and objectives of the state security agencies.

In particular, regarding the issue of the activities of foreign intelligence - the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR - it was emphasized that its task is to facilitate the implementation of the foreign policy course of the country's leadership. At the same time, “obtaining objective information, accurate knowledge of the state of affairs in the world, the plans and aspirations of Western countries in relation to the Soviet Union, possession of information is the duty of the security officers, the duty of the state security agencies” (Government Bulletin, 1989. No. 14 -15).

Speaking about the priorities, main directions and principles of restructuring in the work of state security agencies, V.A. Kryuchkov defined them as Law, Truth and Glasnost.

The first of them was understood as improving the entire legal framework for both ensuring the security of the country and the activities of the KGB of the USSR. Indeed, the absence of laws on counterintelligence and operational investigative activities made the situation stalemate and acutely raised the question of the legislative basis for the activities of all law enforcement agencies, including the KGB.

The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Armed Forces, together with the KGB, the Prosecutor General's Office and other government bodies, began work on the preparation of draft laws "On State Security", "On Crimes against the State", on KGB bodies.

At the same time, it was assumed that the latter would reveal questions about the principles of activity, tasks and functions of the KGB, the Committee’s place in the comprehensive system of ensuring state security of the country, since many other departments participated in its implementation, relations with other government agencies and public organizations, including the number of state control, as well as the rights and obligations of their employees, the procedure for appealing certain of their actions.

These plans were implemented in the law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” of May 16, 1991.
At the same time, despite the steps taken to expand democratization and transparency in the activities of state security agencies, they remained the object of fierce attacks in many domestic and foreign media. Regarding this targeted propaganda campaign, in one of his interviews, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR noted that “the meaning of all this is clear: to drive a wedge between the people and the security agencies... Therefore, we can pose the rhetorical “eternal” question: “Who benefits from this?” ( “The KGB faces the people... - p. 60).

At the same time, noted Deputy Chairman of the KGB M.I. Ermakov, “we must admit that Soviet citizens still know little about the organs of the Cheka - the KGB. Sometimes we are late in covering events. Sometimes we do it superficially. We see all this and take action to eliminate shortcomings."

Many questions were asked to the leaders of the KGB about the 5th Directorate, formed to counter ideological and political sabotage against the USSR. That is, in fact, the scope of his activities included the fight against crimes against the state, and above all anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR), and organizational anti-Soviet activities (Article 72).

As F.D. Bobkov noted, in 1956-1960, 4,676 people were convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (under Article 58-10 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1928), in 1961-1965. under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1958 - 1072, in 1966-1970. - 295, and in 1981-1985. - 150 people ("Motherland", 1989, No. 11). In total, according to the well-known human rights activist S.A. Kovalev, under Articles 70 ("Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and 190-1 ("Dissemination of knowingly false information discrediting the Soviet state and social system") of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, from 1966 to In 1986, 2,468 people were convicted. At the same time, on December 18, 1987, the KGB of the USSR submitted a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee to release 401 convicts and 23 persons under investigation under the same articles from criminal liability (Moscow News, 1992, No. 32, August 9).

Characterizing the activities of the 5th Directorate of the KGB, V.A. Kryuchkov in an interview with the newspaper Izvestia (October 26, 1989) admitted for the first time that state security agencies in the 70s and 80s identified and prevented more than 1,500 persons who harbored terrorist plans .

In connection with the changes taking place in the country, as well as changes in criminal legislation, in particular, in the disposition of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, in the summer of 1989 it was decided to abolish the 5th Directorate and create the USSR KGB Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate "Z").

As First Deputy Chairman of the KGB F.D. Bobkov, who previously headed the 5th Directorate for many years, noted, “it may seem strange, but for the first time in the entire history of the country, the state security agencies have been publicly and clearly entrusted with the task of protecting the constitutional system” (“Motherland”, 1989, No. 11).

According to the technology that existed at that time for making political and organizational and personnel decisions, the note of the KGB chairman on August 11 was considered by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and, based on its results, the draft corresponding Resolution of the Council of Ministers was approved (No. 634-143 of August 13).

On this legal basis, on August 29, the Chairman of the KGB issued Order No. 00124 on the abolition of the 5th Directorate and the formation of the “Z” Directorate.

E.F. Ivanov became the head of the new department, and on January 30, 1990 he was replaced by V.P. Vorotnikov.

Breaking the chronological order, we note that on September 25, 1991, by order of V.V. Bakatin, who became the chairman of the KGB, Vorotnikov was relieved of his post, and soon the department itself was liquidated.

Subsequently, the actual successors of the “Z” department were first the Department for Combating Terrorism (UBT) of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (1992-1993), and then the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional System and Combating Terrorism of the FSB of Russia.

Retrospectively assessing the activities of the Directorate “Z” of the KGB from the standpoint of today, one should objectively admit that it did not fulfill many of these tasks, which, however, is the fault of not only its employees and leadership, but also, above all, the political leadership of the country, who showed inconsistency and indecisiveness both in defending the Constitution of the country and in implementing his own political line, which was generated both by the lack of a real thought-out concept for the development of social relations, and by the ever-increasing pressure on him from anti-Soviet and antisocial elements associated, in particular , both with numerous anti-Soviet centers and organized crime.

The increase in crime in the country noted since the mid-80s, the aggravation of the crime situation at the turn of the 90s, required both certain organizational and staffing changes and appropriate legal regulation. And the basis for it was laid by the resolution of the USSR Supreme Council of August 4, 1989 “On the decisive strengthening of the fight against crime.”

One of the features of the development of the crime situation and operational situation in the country was the growth of economic crime, its merging with ordinary and violent crime, the formation of mafia-type criminal communities, which was accompanied by corruption of government officials who actually sided with serving criminal clans.

Along with this, there was an increase in organized crime, characterized by a higher level of criminal “professionalism,” secrecy, technical equipment, organizational cohesion, scale, and the presence of connections in administrative and economic management bodies.

Organized criminal groups both acquired international criminal connections, experience and “weight”, and became politicized and actively became involved in undermining the foundations of state power in the country.

According to law enforcement agencies, in 1989 there were about 700 criminal groups operating in the country, and their annual turnover amounted to an astronomical amount - more than 100 million rubles.

As V.A. Kryuchkov noted later in his speech at the XYIII Congress of the CPSU, only on the basis of materials from the KGB in 1989, members of about 300 organized criminal groups were brought to criminal responsibility, illegally acquired currency and valuables worth more than 170 million rubles.

Despite the warnings, in subsequent years organized crime burst into “operational space.” And a significant contribution to this was made by the hasty decisions of 1991 to liquidate the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Directorate "OP" of the KGB of the USSR.

Characterizing the further development of the operational situation in the country on July 2, 1990, V.A. Kryuchkov noted “the growth of separatism, interethnic clashes, loss of life - all this is both human pain and the front of the everyday work of the security officers. People are killed only because they are different nationality. In peacetime, hundreds of thousands of refugees appeared... Reading reports about hundreds of killed, thousands of wounded, new tens of thousands expelled, you experience a state far from feeling like a happy person. If the wave of violence is not immediately put an end to, the consequences will become unpredictable .

Of course, there are omissions in the work of law enforcement agencies, but, you see, the basis for combating such negative phenomena should rest on principled political approaches...

There is not a single state in the world in which democracy and openness operate in isolation from the rule of law. We have a serious gap here. And every day it costs more and more.

It is impossible to advocate for the full development of democracy and at the same time not to advocate for law and order, for the triumph of the Law. A society that allows the Law to be mocked is sick for this reason alone.

The question is often asked: where are the KGB looking? ...Society cannot tolerate interference in our internal affairs, allow people's property to be stolen and taken abroad with impunity, military and state secrets behind which are the labor and interests of millions of people...

In the West they openly say that they do not intend to curtail intelligence work on the Soviet Union, and they are allocating many times more funds for it than we can afford.

The experience of five years of perestroika shows that socialism and democracy need to be protected. Extremists are acting more and more boldly, making extensive use of weapons, and inciting people to commit state crimes. We consider suppressing the criminal activities of extremists as our important task...

The information received by the KGB about brewing interethnic conflicts, as a rule, was promptly brought to the attention of Soviet, party, and law enforcement agencies - this was the case with the events in Dushanbe and in the Osh region... Anticipatory information did not help. I see the fault of the authorities in the fact that they did not show proper persistence. The main thing is that we missed the moment when political methods can yield results in resolving emerging conflicts."

Later, the Supreme Council was informed about changes in the situation in the country in 1991 by the head of the KGB Analytical Directorate N.S. Leonov and V.A. Kryuchkov (see: their memoirs “Hard Years” and “Personal Affair”, where the texts of the corresponding speeches are given) .

In his speech on June 17, 1991 at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the Kremlin, V.A. Kryuchkov emphasized: “The reality is that our Fatherland is on the brink of disaster. What I will tell you, we write in our documents to the President and We do not hide the essence of the problems that we are studying. Society is gripped by an acute crisis that threatens the vital interests of the people, the inalienable rights of all citizens of the USSR, and the very foundations of the Soviet state..."

It was then that Andropov’s special message was announced to the CPSU Central Committee about plans to use agents of influence against the USSR. Following this, the KGB chairman remarked: “in a few days it will be exactly half a century since the war against the Soviet Union began, the most difficult war in the history of our peoples. And you are probably reading in the newspapers now how intelligence officers then informed the country’s leadership that what the enemy is doing, what preparations are being made, and that our country is facing war.

As you know, they didn’t listen to this then. I am very afraid that some time will pass, and historians, studying reports not only from the State Security Committee, but also from our other departments, will be amazed at the fact that we did not attach due importance to many very serious things. I think it's worth thinking about for all of us."

And at the end of this speech it was said: “... there is no such fundamental issue on which we would not present objective, sharp, proactive, often impartial information to the country’s leadership and would not make a completely specific proposal.

However, of course, an adequate response is needed."

But this adequate reaction was not always followed by the country's top leadership.

Concluding a brief review of the history and activities of the state security bodies of the USSR during the period of perestroika, we will try to answer a question that aroused and still arouses keen interest, such as the number of KGB employees of the USSR.

Very informed foreign researchers Norman Polmer and Allen B. Thomas cite the figure that by the end of the 80s of the last century, about 400 thousand people worked and served in the KGB agencies and troops (see: Encyclopedia of Espionage. - M. - 1999 - p.198). At the same time, these authors estimated the number of border troops to range from 230 to 250 thousand military personnel, and about 50 thousand - government communications troops.

The operational units, together with intelligence, radio counterintelligence, security service, encryption and decryption service and operational and technical units, thus accounted for about 100 thousand military personnel and civilian personnel.

On August 21, 1991, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov was arrested for participation in the preparation of education and in the activities of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). Criminal cases in this regard were also initiated against the deputy heads of the KGB G.E. Ageev and V.A. Ponomarev, the head of the VGU V.F. Grushko, the head and deputy head of the security service Yu.S. Plekhanov and V.V. Generalov , Head of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region V.M. Prilukov.

By decree of the President of the USSR dated August 28, a State Commission was formed to investigate the activities of state security agencies, headed by Deputy of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR S.V. Stepashin. And on November 28, it was transformed into the State Commission for the Reorganization of State Security Bodies.

On September 25, V.V. Bakatin, who served as KGB chairman for 63 days - from August 23 to October 22, dismissed 31 senior officials and another 13 were pointed out “for their demonstrated political immaturity and short-sightedness in carrying out the orders of their superiors, who contributed to the activities of the putschists.” (Bakatin V.V. Deliverance from the KGB - M. - 1992 - p. 73).

The process of irreversible collapse of the system of measures to ensure state and national security of the USSR and Russia began.

On August 29, on the basis of 3 KGB departments - government communications, 8th main and 16th, the Government Communications Committee was formed - later - FAPSI of the Russian Federation.

By a resolution of the State Council of the USSR of October 22, 1991, the KGB of the USSR was abolished, and on its basis it was planned to organize:

Central Intelligence Service (CSR);

Inter-Republican Security Service (MSB);

Committee for the Protection of the State Border of the USSR.

The KGB of the RSFSR, which existed rather on paper - in May 1991, its entire staff of 14 people was located in 4 offices in the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR - on November 1, the 7th directorate, the 12th department, the pre-trial detention center and a number of services of the Operational and Technical Directorate of the KGB were transferred THE USSR.

By Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated November 26 No. 233, the KGB of the RSFSR was transformed into the National Security Agency (NSA) of the RSFSR, and already

On December 19, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the creation of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs - MBIA - which was to include the TsSR, SME, AFB and structures of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the RSFSR, the minister of which was appointed a career employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs V.P. .Barannikov.

But this decree also remained unimplemented: already on January 22, 1992, the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR recognized it as inconsistent with the Constitution of the RSFSR, and therefore, by presidential decree of January 24, the Ministry of Security (MB) of the RSFSR was formed.

But that's a completely different story.

Oleg KHLOBUSTOV, senior researcher at the FSB Academy

Who and how protected the Chairman of the Council of Ministers? Is it easy to become the president's “shadow”? Colonel of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR Oleg Borshchev, who guarded many of the country's leaders - from Kosygin to Yeltsin - knows the answers to these questions like no one else.

"MK" found out that:

■ the bodyguard had to be able, if necessary, to put on lenses for the protected person and predict the desires;

■ security officers were supposed to shine with a sense of humor;

■ The bodyguard considered his most sorrowful mission to be accompanying the body of his former boss to the morgue.

Oleg Alexandrovich, you don’t just get into the 9th Directorate of the KGB... How did you get such a job?

I served in the Kremlin (now called the Presidential) regiment. At that time, Muscovites were called here twice a year and they tried to take physically trained, and even better, discharge-level athletes. When the time came to demobilize, I was offered to stay and work in the Kremlin. Moreover, I have repeatedly been a prize-winner in the swimming competitions of the Moscow City Council and the Dynamo Central Council. Well, in general, I myself was interested in working in such a place.

And you were immediately assigned to guard one of the top officials?

No, what are you talking about! I was also trained at the KGB school. Then he worked for several years in the commandant’s office of the government buildings of the 9th Directorate. And only in 1976 he was transferred to the personal security unit. What were my responsibilities? Daily work on studying objects visited by protected persons, work with government and political figures of foreign countries. I remember at one of the last congresses of the CPSU Central Committee, I served for two weeks at the main entrance through which the guards passed to meetings in the Kremlin twice a day.
And only when the leadership decided that I could be entrusted with more responsible work, I was sent to the security unit of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (later he headed the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee) Mikhail Sergeevich Solomentsev.
My position at that time was called “deputy head of the security department.” In total, I worked with Solomentsev for 6 years. He did not like to attract attention to himself and tried in every possible way to have as few guards around him as possible.

Here is one example: when we were in Sochi, Mikhail Sergeevich suddenly decided to visit the market and asked not to tell anyone about it. Go. While we were walking, one woman kept asking me: “Isn’t this Solomentsev?” “Probably similar,” I answered calmly. And Solomentsev was very pleased that he managed to blend into the crowd with ordinary customers. Mikhail Sergeevich and his wife loved to be outdoors: they always walked around the territory of the facility in Barvikha, in the forest, for two hours.
And in winter, Mikhail Sergeevich went skiing every weekend. Security, of course, was always nearby. He also loved to swim. He swam very far, despite his advanced age. At sea he was always accompanied by a personal doctor and security officers, of course.

He was also an avid hunter and fisherman. In the south I often caught horse mackerel with a fishing rod. There were a dozen bare hooks on the line, and five fish at a time were caught on them. They were cooked on special firewood and, smoked, served for dinner.

Did the leaders of the Soviet state choose their own security officers?

Of course not. But their consent to the proposed candidacy was required. And when they brought me to Solomentsev, he immediately approved my candidacy. It turned out that he remembered me when I worked at the CPSU Congress.

Then you moved to Anatoly Lukyanov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (he was the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1990–1991)?

Yes. But I worked with him for a short time, when his main security officers were on vacation (I was on a substitution). I was amazed at how correct and intelligent he is. Once he spoke at Moscow State University, where lawyers from all over the USSR gathered (the country was then in the period of so-called perestroika and glasnost). Lukyanov made a short introductory speech and suddenly offered to ask him any questions.

And notes poured in from the audience, some with very pointed, sometimes provocative questions. He forbade their interception and censorship. And he answered everything without hesitation, so much so that the whole hall applauded. It lasted over two hours! And when we were returning together in the car, he asked: “How do you think I answered?”

And what did you answer?

What could I answer? Honestly he said that he was delighted. And then I was transferred from Lukyanov to Boris Karlovich Pugo. I remember when Lukyanov found out about this, he told me: “Pugo is a very good person. What a score".

And are you really lucky?

And how! Pugo was very easy to work with. He turned out to be a simple, accessible and intelligent person. And by the way, I was with him immediately after his election as a candidate member of the Politburo and until the last. When I asked him if he had any comments about anyone from our security team at work, he invariably received a smile and the answer: “Everything is fine.” He always addressed me by my first name and patronymic and “you”.

My colleagues often carried folders and briefcases that belonged to the guards. But Boris Karlovich never gave me a folder in my hands - he understood that the “attached” person should always have his hands free. I think this is due to the fact that at one time he headed the KGB of Latvia and understood the work of security. The only exception was when the two of us were riding in the elevator and he needed to comb his hair.

Many memories are associated with Pugo. I remember once we were in Crimea. We were met at the plane's exit by the head of the local security department, whom I knew very well. I introduced him to Pugo: “Boris Karlovich, this is Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy.” Pugo thought I was joking. But my colleague was indeed both a descendant and full namesake of the great writer.

Another funny incident was during a business trip to China. The wife asked Boris Karlovich to buy her shoes there. And I immediately warned not to do this: I had already been to China with other guards and knew that their women’s shoes had a hard last. He advised me to buy vases made of fine porcelain and a silk robe with a dragon.
But he bought the shoes anyway. And then, when they returned to Moscow, she laughed: none of them fit, but the robe and vases really made an impression on her. While on vacation at the Yuzhny sanatorium (where many protected persons, including Yakovlev and Primakov, were vacationing at the same time), Pugo loved to play billiards, and I often kept him company. He also became interested in tennis. I even played with an instructor at the Reception House on Vorobyovy Gory.

HELP "MK"
In 1990-1991 Pugo was the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. After the defeat of the State Emergency Committee, a criminal case was opened against B.K. Pugo on charges of participation in an anti-constitutional conspiracy. In other words, for organizing and membership in the State Emergency Committee, Boris Pugo was threatened with arrest and a public trial. But he did not wait for the new government to decide his fate and on August 22, 1991, he committed suicide. His wife also left with him. Boris Pugo’s son, Vadim Pugo, said later: “I think that he and his mother did everything right. I can’t imagine how my father could have lived after August 1991.”

Were you with him on the day of his death?

No. On August 20, I took over and watched the events that took place in the country on the 20th and 21st on TV. And on the 22nd they called me and told me to urgently come to the unit. It was then that I found out that Boris Karlovich had shot himself... And a few days before, during my duty, he was in a good mood.
I was waiting for guests - my mother and brother from Riga. In my presence, on the eve of the tragic events, he went to the Ministry of Defense to meet with Minister Yazov and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov. I then thought that they were talking about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but, apparently, I was mistaken... Our entire group, which guarded him, was very sad for Boris Karlovich and his wife.

Why do you think the wife also decided to commit suicide?

Valentina Ivanovna loved him very much. This was noticeable to anyone with the naked eye. He also doted on her. This was an extraordinary couple. So, they probably made the decision to leave together.

Was Suslov also guarded?

Moreover, when he died, I even accompanied his body from the hospital to the morgue. I was with him before the autopsy began... During his life, Mikhail Andreevich was a very modest, unassuming person. But he was one of the first to wear contact lenses. The doctors gave us special classes and explained how we could take them off and put them on if necessary. They also warned that guards should be careful when moving with lenses on uneven surfaces (for example, stairs).

Because lenses can get lost?

No, that's not why. There was a possibility that Suslov would stumble out of habit (his vision is being corrected). There was also one interesting incident with him. Mikhail Andreevich and I arrive at the Central Committee building, climb the stairs to the elevator. There are three people standing in front of us on the platform and actively discussing something. And just at that moment when we approached, one of them, in the uniform of an army general, explaining something to his interlocutors, sharply throws his hand back, and it flies straight towards Suslov’s head. I managed to block this gesture. The army general turned around (apparently he wanted to scold the one who interfered with his story and gestures). You should have seen his apology to Mikhail Andreevich!..

Many of Yeltsin’s entourage said that it was very, very difficult with him...

I worked with him for more than 4 years, but did not serve as a bodyguard. My tasks included participation in the preparation and provision of security measures with his participation in Moscow and during trips around the country and abroad. It was an interesting time. Boris Nikolayevich traveled a lot, often made decisions unexpectedly, and we always had to be on “combat readiness.” Yeltsin was the brightest figure, unlike anyone else. We tried to adapt to his mood, in some cases even predict. It didn't always work out...

Once in Blagoveshchensk (there was a meeting with the leadership of the region), on the way to the residence he gave the order to stop near the first store he came across. We deviated from the route and stopped. He went there, looked at the assortment (there were 4 types of fish, and even those were not very good) and angrily scolded the local authorities: “They told me that there are more than 200 breeds of fish in the region and almost all of them are on store shelves!”

Did foreign leaders have to be guarded during their visit to our country?

Certainly. The list is very long - I had to work with Kadar, Tsedenbal, Cason Fonvihan, Indira Gandhi... But most of all I remember the President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq. He came to the funeral of one of the General Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. And according to protocol, security officers were required to communicate with the protected person to a minimum during such visits.

Moreover, in the Soviet Union, the rule of the Pakistani president was considered dictatorial. In a word, I behaved extremely carefully. Suddenly, before going up the stairs to board the plane, Zia-ul-Haq came up to me and hugged me twice. It was so unexpected that I was taken aback. Now I am very pleased to remember this. I think he liked the work of the Soviet guards.

More materials on this topic:

Holy Guard

In St. Peter's Cathedral, the Christmas Divine Liturgy, led by Pope Benedict XVI, ended at midnight local time. The beginning of the ceremony was overshadowed by an incident: a certain woman jumped over the barrier separating the audience and knocked the 83-year-old pontiff off his feet.

(until May 16, 1991) and the highest bodies of state power and management of the USSR with information affecting the state security and defense of the country, the socio-economic situation in the Soviet Union and issues of foreign policy and foreign economic activity of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

The KGB system of the USSR included fourteen republican state security committees on the territory of the republics of the USSR; local state security bodies in autonomous republics, territories, regions, individual cities and districts, military districts, formations and units of the army, navy and internal troops, in transport; border troops; government communications troops; military counterintelligence agencies; educational institutions and research institutions; as well as the so-called “first departments” of Soviet institutions, organizations and enterprises.

Over the years, the KGB had different official names and status in the system of central government bodies:

Currently, in addition to its main meaning, the abbreviation “KGB” and its derivatives are often used colloquially to refer to any intelligence services of the USSR, RSFSR, and the Russian Federation.

Story

KGB education

The initiative to separate “operational security departments and departments” into an independent department is attributed to the Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Kruglov, who on February 4, 1954 submitted an official note with a corresponding proposal to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Kruglov’s proposals were discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on February 8, 1954 and were fully approved, with the exception that “on business” was removed from the name proposed by the minister - “Committee for State Security Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR”. A month later, on March 13, 1954, it was formed State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The new committee included departments, services and departments allocated from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that dealt with issues of ensuring state security. The former First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel General I. A. Serov, was appointed chairman of the committee.

It is noteworthy that the KGB was not formed as a central body of government, as its predecessors were - the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - but only with the status of a department under the Government of the USSR. According to some historians, the reason for the downgrade of the status of the KGB in the hierarchy of government bodies was the desire of the party and Soviet elite of the country to deprive the state security agencies of independence, completely subordinating their activities to the apparatus of the Communist Party. However, the KGB chairmen were appointed to their positions not by orders of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as was customary for heads of departments under the government of the country, but by Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as was done for ministers and chairmen of state committees.

1950s

Almost immediately after its formation, the KGB underwent a major structural reorganization and a reduction in the number of employees in connection with what began after the death of I.V. Stalin's process of de-Stalinization of society and the state. From declassified documents of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, it became known that in the 1950s the number of KGB personnel was reduced by more than 50 percent compared to 1954. More than 3.5 thousand city and district apparatuses were abolished, some operational and investigative units were merged, investigative departments and departments in operational units were liquidated and merged into single investigative apparatuses. The structure of special departments and bodies of the KGB in transport was significantly simplified. In 1955, more than 7.5 thousand employees were additionally laid off, while about 8 thousand KGB officers were transferred to the position of civilian employees.

The KGB continued the practice of its predecessors - Bureau No. 1 of the USSR Ministry of State Security for sabotage work abroad under the leadership of P. A. Sudoplatov and Bureau No. 2 for carrying out special tasks on the territory of the USSR under the leadership of V. A. Drozdov - in the field of conducting so-called " active actions", which meant acts of individual terror on the territory of the country and abroad against persons who were qualified by party bodies and Soviet intelligence services as "the most active and vicious enemies of the Soviet Union from among the figures of capitalist countries, especially dangerous foreign intelligence officers, leaders of anti-Soviet emigrant organizations and traitors to the Motherland." The conduct of such operations was entrusted to the First Main Directorate of the KGB. Thus, in October 1959, the leader of Ukrainian nationalists Stepan Bandera was killed in Munich by KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky. The same fate befell another OUN leader, L. Rebet.

1960s

In December 1961, on the initiative of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev, A.N. Shelepin was transferred to party work as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The leadership of the KGB was taken over by V. E. Semichastny, Shelepin’s former colleague from work in the Central Committee of the Komsomol. Semichastny continued the policy of his predecessor on the structural reorganization of the KGB. The 4th, 5th and 6th KGB departments were merged into the Main Directorate of Internal Security and Counterintelligence (2nd Main Directorate). The corresponding functional units of the 2nd Main Directorate came under the wing of the 7th Directorate, which was responsible for the protection of the diplomatic corps and external surveillance. The 3rd Main Directorate was demoted to directorate status. Corresponding structural changes took place in the KGB bodies of the union and autonomous republics, in the territories and regions. In 1967, the offices of commissioners in cities and districts were reorganized into city and district departments and departments of the KGB-UKGB-OKGB. As a result of the reduction of numerous structural links, the apparatus of the State Security Committee became more operational, while the creation in 1967 on the initiative of the new chairman Yu. V. Andropov's KGB fifth directorate to combat dissidents made the KGB better prepared to fight opponents of the Soviet system in the next two decades.

1970-1980s

The fight against dissidents in the USSR

The activities of the KGB in the 1970-80s were significantly influenced by the socio-economic processes occurring in the country during the period of “developed socialism” and changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. During this period, the KGB focused its efforts on combating nationalism and anti-Soviet manifestations within the country and abroad. Domestically, state security agencies have stepped up the fight against dissent and the dissident movement; however, the actions of physical violence, deportations and imprisonments became more subtle and disguised. The use of psychological pressure on dissidents has increased, including surveillance, pressure through public opinion, undermining professional careers, preventive conversations, deportation from the USSR, forced confinement in psychiatric clinics, political trials, slander, lies and compromising evidence, various provocations and intimidation. There was a ban on the residence of politically unreliable citizens in the capital cities of the country - the so-called “exile beyond the 101st kilometer”. Under the close attention of the KGB during this period were, first of all, representatives of the creative intelligentsia - figures of literature, art and science - who, due to their social status and international authority, could cause the most widespread damage to the reputation of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

The activities of the KGB in the persecution of the Soviet writer, Nobel Prize winner in literature A. I. Solzhenitsyn are indicative. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a special unit was created in the KGB - the 9th Department of the Fifth Directorate of the KGB - exclusively engaged in the operational development of a dissident writer. In August 1971, the KGB attempted to physically eliminate Solzhenitsyn - during a trip to Novocherkassk, he was secretly injected with an unknown poisonous substance; the writer survived, but after that he was seriously ill for a long time. In the summer of 1973, KGB officers detained one of the writer’s assistants, E. Voronyanskaya, and during interrogation forced her to reveal the location of one copy of the manuscript of Solzhenitsyn’s work “The Gulag Archipelago”. Returning home, the woman hanged herself. Having learned about what had happened, Solzhenitsyn ordered the publication of “Archipelago” to begin in the West. A powerful propaganda campaign was launched in the Soviet press, accusing the writer of slandering the Soviet state and social system. Attempts by the KGB, through Solzhenitsyn’s ex-wife, to persuade the writer to refuse to publish “Archipelago” abroad in exchange for a promise of assistance in the official publication of his story “Cancer Ward” in the USSR were unsuccessful and the first volume of the work was published in Paris in December 1973. In January 1974, Solzhenitsyn was arrested, accused of treason, deprived of Soviet citizenship and expelled from the USSR. The initiator of the deportation of the writer was Andropov, whose opinion became decisive in choosing the measure to “suppress anti-Soviet activities” of Solzhenitsyn at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. After the writer was expelled from the country, the KGB and Andropov personally continued the campaign to discredit Solzhenitsyn and, as Andropov put it, “exposing the active use by reactionary circles of the West of such renegades in ideological sabotage against the countries of the socialist commonwealth.”

Prominent scientists were the target of many years of persecution by the KGB. For example, the Soviet physicist, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, dissident and human rights activist, Nobel Peace Prize laureate A.D. Sakharov has been under KGB surveillance since the 1960s, subjected to searches and numerous insults in the press. In 1980, on charges of anti-Soviet activities, Sakharov was arrested and sent into exile without trial in the city of Gorky, where he spent 7 years under house arrest under the control of KGB officers. In 1978, the KGB attempted, on charges of anti-Soviet activities, to initiate a criminal case against the Soviet philosopher, sociologist and writer A. A. Zinoviev with the aim of sending him for compulsory treatment to a psychiatric hospital, however, “taking into account the campaign launched in the West around psychiatry in USSR" this preventive measure was considered inappropriate. Alternatively, in a memorandum to the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB leadership recommended allowing Zinoviev and his family to travel abroad and blocking his entry into the USSR.

To monitor the USSR's implementation of the Helsinki Agreements on the observance of human rights, in 1976 a group of Soviet dissidents formed the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG), the first leader of which was the Soviet physicist, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR Yu. F. Orlov. Since its formation, the MHG was subjected to constant persecution and pressure from the KGB and other security agencies of the Soviet state. Members of the group were threatened, forced to emigrate, and forced to stop their human rights activities. Since February 1977, activists Yu. F. Orlov, A. Ginzburg, A. Sharansky and M. Landa began to be arrested. In the Sharansky case, the KGB received the sanction of the CPSU Central Committee to prepare and publish a number of propaganda articles, as well as to write and transmit to US President J. Carter a personal letter from the defendant’s father-in-law denying the fact of Sharansky’s marriage and “exposing” his immoral character. Under pressure from the KGB in 1976-1977, members of the MHG L. Alekseeva, P. Grigorenko and V. Rubin were forced to emigrate. Between 1976 and 1982, eight members of the group were arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment or exile (a total of 60 years in camps and 40 years in exile), six more were forced to emigrate from the USSR and were deprived of citizenship. In the fall of 1982, under conditions of increasing repression, the three remaining members of the group were forced to announce the cessation of the activities of the MHG. The Moscow Helsinki Group was able to resume its activities only in 1989, at the height of Gorbachev's perestroika.

Fight against Zionism

In the summer of 1970, a group of Soviet refuseniks attempted to hijack a passenger plane with the aim of emigrating from the USSR. By forces of the KGB, the participants of the action were arrested and put on trial on charges of treason (attempted escape by illegally crossing the state border), attempted theft on an especially large scale (airplane hijacking) and anti-Soviet agitation.

Regularly, with the permission of the CPSU Central Committee, state security agencies took measures to confiscate correspondence, parcels and material assistance sent from abroad to persons or organizations that were classified by the KGB as “hostile.” For example, every year the KGB was involved in the confiscation of parcels of matzo sent by Jewish communities from abroad to Soviet Jews for the holiday of Passover.

On the initiative of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB of the USSR, the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public was created in the USSR in 1983, which, under the leadership of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee and state security agencies, was engaged in propaganda and publishing activities.

"Ideological operations" of the KGB

A special place in the arsenal of the KGB’s means of combating ideology hostile to the Soviet system and its bearers was occupied by the preparation and formation of public opinion through the press, cinema, theater, television and radio. In 1978, a special prize was established by the KGB of the USSR in the field of literature and art, which was awarded to writers and actors whose works realized the ideological plans of the leadership of the state security agencies or covered the activities of committee employees in accordance with the official point of view of the leadership of the KGB and the CPSU Central Committee. Thanks to this policy, such films as Seventeen Moments of Spring, The Omega Option, and Shield and Sword appeared.

According to some researchers, the KGB recruited individual cultural, literary and scientific figures in the USSR and abroad to carry out targeted actions called “ideological operations”. So these researchers suggest that in the 1970s, the state security agencies recruited the Soviet historian-Americanist, Doctor of Historical Sciences N. N. Yakovlev to write a number of books commissioned by the KGB - in particular, “August 1, 1914” and “CIA against the USSR " - claiming serious scientific research in the field of history based on materials provided to the writer by the head of the 5th KGB Directorate, General F. D. Bobkov. Many of these materials were fabrications. Yakovlev’s books, published in millions of copies, set out the position of the ideological and punitive institutions of the USSR; American intelligence and Soviet dissidents were presented in a negative light, who were portrayed as “renegades,” “enemies of the people,” “two-faced, immoral types acting on the instructions of Western intelligence services.” Thus, the writer A.I. Solzhenitsyn presented himself as a “faithful servant of the CIA” and “ideologist of fascism”, human rights activist V.K. Bukovsky - a “seasoned criminal”, etc. Similar literature was published in collaboration with the 5th Directorate of the KGB by the authors N Reshetovskaya, N. Vitkevich. T. Rzezach.

The scope of the KGB’s “ideological operations” was not limited to the borders of the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1970s, the KGB, together with the Cuban intelligence service DGI, carried out a long-term Operation Toucan, aimed at discrediting the government of Augusto Pinochet in Chile. During the operation, dozens of articles were published in the Western media (in particular, in the American newspaper New York Times), negatively covering the persecution of political opponents by the Pinochet regime and whitewashing the human rights situation in Cuba. The publications used documents provided by the KGB. In India, where the KGB station was the largest outside the USSR in the 1970s and 80s, Soviet intelligence services “fed” ten newspapers and one news agency. KGB resident in India L.V. Shebarshin, who later became the head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, wrote in his memoirs: “The hand of the CIA was also felt in the publications of some Indian newspapers. We, of course, paid in the same coin.” The committee spent over ten million American dollars to support Indira Gandhi's party and anti-American propaganda in India. To convince the Indian government of US intrigues, the KGB fabricated forgeries under the guise of CIA documents. According to reports from the Soviet station in India, in 1972, about four thousand articles favorable to the Soviet state security agencies were financed from the KGB for publication in the Indian press; in 1975 this figure increased to five thousand.

Developing countries

In the context of intensifying political, military and ideological confrontation between the superpowers in the 1970s and 80s, the KGB made active efforts to expand the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union in the countries of the “third world” - in Latin America, Africa, Central and Southeast Asia.

Europe and North America

In 1978, Bulgarian writer and dissident Georgi Markov was killed in London by the Bulgarian secret services. The physical elimination of the Bulgarian dissident was carried out by pricking with an umbrella containing tiny granules of ricin, a poison produced in the 12th KGB laboratory and provided to Bulgarian colleagues for the operation.

The official date of abolition of the State Security Committee of the USSR is considered to be December 3, 1991 - the date of signing by USSR President M. S. Gorbachev of USSR Law No. 124-N “On the reorganization of state security bodies”, on the basis of which the liquidation of the KGB as a government body was legalized. At the same time, the republican and local security agencies that were part of the KGB system of the USSR passed into the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign republics within the USSR.

Legal basis of activity and subordination

Unlike other government bodies of the USSR, the State Security Committee was party-state institution - in its legal status, the KGB was a government body and, at the same time, was directly subordinate to the highest bodies of the Communist Party - the Central Committee of the CPSU and its Politburo. The latter was enshrined in, which from a legal point of view determined the “merging of the CPSU and state security bodies” and made the KGB “the armed force of the party, physically and politically protecting the power of the CPSU, allowing the party to exercise effective and strict control over society.”

Unlike their central body, which was required to regularly report on its activities to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Government of the USSR, the republican and local state security bodies were not accountable to anyone except the KGB itself and the corresponding local party bodies.

In addition to carrying out functions traditional for intelligence services (in particular, protecting the state border, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, combating terrorism, etc.), the USSR State Security Committee had the right, under the supervision of the prosecutor's office, to conduct investigations into cases of state crimes, but could without sanction The prosecutor conducts searches, detentions and arrests of persons exposed or suspected of activities directed against the Soviet system and the Communist Party.

An attempt to remove the State Security Committee from the control of the Communist Party and completely subordinate its activities to state authorities and administration was made in the last year of the existence of the Soviet Union. On May 16, 1991, the USSR Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” was adopted, according to which control over the activities of the KGB of the USSR began to be exercised by the highest legislative body of the country, the head of state and the Soviet government, while the republican state security bodies of the republics became accountable to the highest bodies state power and administration of the respective republics, as well as the KGB of the USSR itself.

“The legal basis for the activities of state security bodies is the Constitution of the USSR, the constitutions of the republics, this Law and other legislative acts of the USSR and republics, acts of the President of the USSR, resolutions and orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR and the governments of the republics, as well as acts of the State Security Committee issued in accordance with them USSR and state security agencies of the republics.
Employees of state security agencies in their official activities are guided by the requirements of the law and are not bound by the decisions of political parties and mass social movements pursuing political goals.”

Art. 7, paragraph 16 of the USSR Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR”

At the same time, the state security agencies retained police functions - they were allowed to conduct inquiries and preliminary investigations in cases of crimes, the investigation of which was assigned by law to the jurisdiction of the state security agencies; carry out control of postal items and wiretapping of telephone conversations without the sanction of the prosecutor; carry out arrests without the sanction of the prosecutor and hold in custody persons detained by state security agencies on suspicion of committing crimes.

Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 16, 1991 No. 2160-1 “On the implementation of the USSR Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” also provided for the development and approval by January 1, 1992 of a new regulation on the State Security Committee of the USSR to replace the 1959 regulation However, the new document was not approved - on December 3, 1991, the KGB of the USSR was abolished.

Relations between the KGB and the CPSU

Despite the fact that formally the State Security Committee was endowed with the rights of a union-republican ministry and carried out its activities under the auspices of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - first as a department under the government, and then as a central government body - the actual leadership of the KGB was carried out by the highest bodies of the Communist Party The Soviet Union represented by the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo. From the moment of its formation until May 16, 1991 - six months before its abolition - the KGB was actually removed from the control of the Soviet government. Certain aspects of the KGB's activities - in particular, subordination to the party, the fight against dissent, exemption from following certain norms of criminal procedural law - endowed the specialized units of the KGB with the characteristic features of the secret police.

Party control

• determined the status of state security agencies and regulated their activities;
• determined the main tasks of state security agencies and specific areas of their activities;
• established the general structure of state security agencies;
• formulated goals, identified subjects and prescribed methods of combating them, based on the current political situation, which entailed “large-scale repressive measures”;
• approved the organizational structure and staffing of state security agencies, controlling structural transformations and changes in staffing levels at all levels - from the main departments of the central apparatus to the district departments of the KGB;
• approved or approved the main internal regulations of the state security bodies - orders, decisions of the board, regulations and instructions;
• formed the leadership of the state security bodies, in particular, the approval of the chairman of the KGB and his deputies, as well as senior employees of the state security bodies included in the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee or local party bodies;
• determined the personnel policy of security agencies;
• received reports on the activities of state security bodies in general and for its individual structures and areas of activity, while reporting was mandatory and periodic (for a month, a year, a five-year period);
• controlled specific activities or sets of activities of state security agencies and authorized the most important of them on a wide range of issues.

The Central Committee of the CPSU had the right to impose a ban on the publication of orders of the KGB chairman, which affected important, from the point of view of the party leadership, issues of intelligence, operational and investigative work, which contradicted Articles 10, 12 and 13 of 1955, which provided for prosecutorial control of the compliance of regulations, published by departments, the Constitution and laws of the USSR, union and autonomous republics, decrees of the union and republican governments.

As part of the law enforcement activities of the KGB, security agencies were prohibited from collecting incriminating materials on representatives of the party, Soviet and trade union nomenklatura, which removed persons with administrative, supervisory and economic powers from the control of law enforcement agencies, and marked the beginning of the emergence of organized crime among them.

The functions of the state security bodies invariably included the protection and maintenance of senior party leaders (including while they were on vacation), ensuring the security of major party events (congresses, plenums, meetings), and providing the highest party bodies with technical means and encryption communications. For this purpose, there were special units in the KGB structures, the work and equipment of which were paid from the state, and not from the party budget. According to the regulations of the KGB, it was also entrusted with the protection of the leaders of the Soviet government. At the same time, an analysis of the KGB orders shows a tendency towards the transfer of security and service functions in relation to the state structures themselves to the jurisdiction of the internal affairs bodies, which is evidence that the security and service of party leaders and facilities were a priority for the KGB. In a number of orders on security and maintenance measures, only party leaders are mentioned. In particular, the KGB was entrusted with ensuring the security and services of Politburo members, candidates for Politburo members and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as, in accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, state and political figures of foreign countries during their stay in the USSR. For example, the KGB provided protection and services to B. Karmal, who was permanently residing in Moscow, after his removal in 1986 from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

HR integration

The selection of people to work in the security agencies and educational institutions of the KGB - the so-called “party recruitment” from among ordinary communists, party apparatus workers, Komsomol and Soviet bodies - was carried out systematically under the careful control of the CPSU Central Committee. The most important areas of KGB activity were strengthened, as a rule, by party functionaries - instructors of departments of the Central Committee of the Republican Communist Parties, heads and deputy heads of departments of regional committees, secretaries of city and district party committees. Party bodies at various levels constantly carried out personnel inspections of the KGB apparatus and educational institutions, the results of which were consolidated by decisions of the KGB leadership. But the opposite was not uncommon - the promotion of KGB personnel to leadership positions in party bodies. So, for example, the former chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan G.A. Aliyev became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, in Latvia the head of the republican KGB B.K. Pugo became the leader of the republican communist party, not to mention the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu.V. Andropov, who in 1982 became Secretary and then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Personnel movements were practiced with repeated transitions from party work to the KGB and back. For example, in April 1968, P.P. Laptev, an assistant in the department of the CPSU Central Committee for relations with communist and workers' parties of socialist countries, was sent to work in the KGB, where he immediately received the rank of colonel. Heading the KGB secretariat in 1979, Laptev rose to the rank of general. In 1979, he again went to work for the CPSU Central Committee, becoming an assistant to member of the Politburo of the Central Committee Andropov. From 1984 to 1984 he was assistant secretary, then general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and then returned to work in the KGB. In June, Laptev was appointed first deputy, and in May 1991 - head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Leading employees of the state security bodies were included in the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee and local party bodies, and their appointment and movement from one position to another was carried out by decision of the relevant party body. Thus, the candidacy of the KGB chairman was first approved by the CPSU Central Committee and only after that the chairman was appointed to the position by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, while the appointment of deputy chairmen was carried out by the Council of Ministers of the USSR only after the candidacy was approved by the CPSU Central Committee.

There was also a combination of posts in the party and in the KGB: the chairmen of the KGB of the USSR Andropov, Chebrikov, Kryuchkov were at different times members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. The heads of the territorial bodies of the KGB, as a rule, were members, or candidate members, of the bureau of the corresponding regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics. The same was practiced at the level of city and district committees, whose bureaus also almost necessarily included representatives of state security agencies. In the administrative departments of the party committees there were units supervising the state security agencies. Often these units were staffed by KGB personnel who, during their work in the party apparatus, continued to serve in the KGB, being in the so-called “active reserve”. For example, in 1989, the sector of state security problems of the State Legal Department of the CPSU Central Committee (transformed in 1988 from the sector of state security bodies of the Department of Administrative Bodies and existed under a new name until August 1991) was headed by the Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan, Major General I. I. Gorelovsky. Gorelovsky, who was in party work, was nevertheless nominated by the KGB leadership for the next rank of lieutenant general in the summer of 1990.

Information exchange

For the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the state security organs were the main source of information that made it possible to control the structures of government and manipulate public opinion, while the leaders and ordinary employees of the state security organs saw the CPSU, at least until the end of the 1980s, as “ cornerstone" of the Soviet system and its guiding and guiding force.

In addition to the so-called “staged” issues requiring decision or consent of the CPSU Central Committee, regular information of both an overview and specific nature was sent from state security agencies to party bodies. Reports on the operational situation in the country, reports on the situation on the border and in the border zones of the USSR, political reports, reports on the international situation, reviews of the foreign press, television and radio broadcasting, reports of public comments on certain events or activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and other information was received by party bodies at different intervals and, in different periods of the KGB’s activities, in different assortments, depending on the current needs of the party apparatus and its leadership. In addition to reports, the Central Committee and local party organizations received information concerning specific events and people. This information could be routine, intended for information, or urgent, requiring immediate decisions on the part of party leaders. It is significant that the state security organs sent to the Central Committee both processed and unprocessed, operationally obtained illustrative information - materials from censorship, secret seizures of documents, wiretapping of premises and telephone conversations, and intelligence reports. For example, in 1957, the KGB received reports from the KGB to the CPSU Central Committee against Academician L. D. Landau, including interception materials and reports from agents; in 1987 - recordings of a conversation between Academician A.D. Sakharov and American scientists D. Stone and F. von Hippel. In this regard, the KGB continued the practice of the state security agencies that preceded it: the state archives preserved recordings of home conversations between generals Gordov and Rybalchenko, sent to Stalin by the Soviet secret services in 1947. Throughout its activities, the KGB continued to use special information units created during the first period of the OGPU and whose activities continued to be regulated by the provisions approved by F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

The CPSU Central Committee constantly monitored information work in the state security agencies and demanded accuracy and objectivity of materials sent to party bodies, as evidenced by numerous resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and KGB orders.

Military-political bodies in the KGB troops

Governing bodies

Chairman of the KGB

The activities of the State Security Committee were led by its chairman.

Since the KGB was initially vested with the rights of a ministry, the appointment of its chairman was carried out not by the government, but by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the proposal of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The same procedure for appointing the head of the KGB remained after the KGB acquired the status of a state committee in July 1978. At the same time, neither the Supreme Council nor the government of the USSR, within which the State Security Committee operated, had any real opportunity to influence KGB personnel issues. Before the appointment of the KGB chairman, his candidacy underwent mandatory approval by the Central Committee of the CPSU, under the direct control of which was the State Security Committee. All KGB chairmen (with the exception of V.V. Fedorchuk, who held this position for about seven months) by virtue of their membership in the CPSU Central Committee belonged to the nomenklatura of the highest body of the Communist Party and their appointment, movement from one position to another or removal from office could be carried out only by decision of the CPSU Central Committee. The same procedure applied to deputy chairmen of the KGB, who could be appointed and removed from office by the Council of Ministers of the USSR only if they received permission from the Central Committee of the CPSU.

• Serov, Ivan Alexandrovich (1954-1958)
• Shelepin, Alexander Nikolaevich (1958-1961)
• Semichastny, Vladimir Efimovich (1961-1967)
• Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1967-1982)
• Chebrikov, Viktor Mikhailovich (1982-1988)
• Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich (1988-1991)

Structural divisions of the KGB

The State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR is a special service of the Soviet Union, responsible from March 1954 to November 1991 for ensuring state security and ceased to exist on the eve of the collapse of the USSR after the signing of the Law “On the Reorganization of State Bodies” by USSR President M. S. Gorbachev on December 3, 1991. security."

During the years of its activity, the KGB combined the functions of counterintelligence, foreign intelligence and analysis of information received, counterintelligence in the Armed Forces, protection of the land and sea borders of the USSR, controlled nuclear weapons, was in charge of government communications and protected the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

During the existence of the KGB, its structure changed several times and by the time of its abolition it had the form shown in Fig. 3.1.

By the time of the collapse of the USSR, the KGB included the following Main Directorates:

· 1st Main Directorate - foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, information analysis;

· 2nd Main Directorate - internal counterintelligence, combating subversive actions directed against the state, industrial safety;

· Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV);

· 8th Main Directorate - communications intelligence, communications security, encryption service;

· In addition to the Main Directorates, the KGB structure included the following directorates:

· 3rd Directorate - counterintelligence in the Armed Forces;

· 4th Directorate - security and internal security of embassies;

· 5th Directorate - protection of the constitutional order, which meant the eradication of dissent;

· 6th Department - economic security issues;

· 7th Directorate - external surveillance;

· 15th Directorate - protection of state facilities;

· 16th Directorate - radio interception and electronic reconnaissance;

· Directorate for the construction of military facilities.

At the end of the 60s, the 4th, 5th and 6th departments became part of the 2nd State Administration, and in 1969 they were again separated into independent departments. There were officers of the 3rd KGB Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence in the Armed Forces, in all branches of the military (the so-called “special officers”). They were subordinate only to the KGB and had an extensive network of “informants” in the army. In the Navy, these personnel served on all major surface ships, submarines and shore bases.

Rice. 3.1. Structure of the KGB of the USSR

The 8th Main Directorate was responsible for the protection of technical communications in general and the creation of encryption systems in particular;

Created in 1969, the 16th Directorate was engaged in obtaining information from the communication lines of other countries, which included intercepting encrypted messages from channels belonging to both legal and intelligence communication networks, followed by their decryption, as well as eavesdropping using technical devices and means processing information located on the territory of diplomatic missions of foreign countries.

The 1st Main Directorate, which was organizationally part of the KGB structure, was in fact a completely independent organization and was based in a separate complex of buildings located in Yasenevo (“in the forest,” in the professional slang of KGB officers). The structure of the 1st GU is shown in Fig. 3.2.

Rice. 3.2. Structure of the 1st Main Directorate of the KGB

The work of the 1st State Administration was carried out in the following departments.

1. USA, Canada.

2. Latin America.

3. Great Britain, Australia, Africa, New Zealand, Scandinavia.

4. East Germany, West Germany, Austria.

5. Benelux countries, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania.

6. China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea.

7. Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines.

8. Non-Arab countries of the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey.

9. English-speaking countries in Africa.

10. French-speaking countries of Africa.

11. Contacts with socialist countries.

12. Registration and archives.

13. Electronic interception and operations against encryption services of Western countries.

14. India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma.

15. Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as Egypt.

16. Emigration.

17. Contacts with developing countries.

One of the most interesting joint technical operations of the 1st and 8th Main Directorates was the use of the Amherst system, already mentioned in the previous chapter, to ensure communication with foreign agents, both legal and illegal.

After the collapse of the USSR, the 16th Directorate and the Government Communications Service were removed from the KGB and reorganized into the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAGSI) of the Russian Federation. The KGB itself, after a series of reorganizations, was transformed into the Federal Security Service (FSB). (Currently, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian special services are being reorganized, as a result of which FAPSI and the Border Troops should enter the structure of the FSB.) Compared to the KGB of the USSR, the FSB is a fairly open organization (of course, to the extent that the special service can be opened ). Its tasks and structure can be found on the Internet at the official FSB Web site at http://www.fsb.ru. During the reorganization of the KGB, the 1st Main Directorate was removed from its composition and transformed into a separate service, called the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation. The latter, taking into account the qualifications of its specialists, as well as the role of the Russian Federation in world politics, deserves separate consideration.

In accordance with the new intelligence doctrine of Russia, the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation in the 90s abandoned the policy of globalism. Currently, the SVR operates only in those regions where Russia has genuine, and not imaginary, interests. Intelligence does not formulate its own tasks; they are determined by the country's leadership, based on the interests of the state. In addition, currently in intelligence there is a transition from confrontation with the intelligence services of various countries to interaction and cooperation in those areas where their interests coincide (the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, etc.). However, this interaction is not comprehensive and does not exclude conducting reconnaissance on the territory of certain countries, based on the national interests of the Russian Federation.

Currently, the SVR conducts reconnaissance in three main areas: political, economic and scientific-technical.

In the field of political intelligence, the SVR is faced with the following tasks: to obtain proactive information about the policies of the leading states of the world in the international arena regarding Russia; monitor the development of crisis situations in “hot spots” on the planet that may pose a threat to Russia’s national security; obtain information about attempts by individual countries to create new types of weapons, especially nuclear ones; through its channels, provide active assistance in the implementation of Russian foreign policy.

In the field of economic intelligence, the SVR faces the following tasks: protecting the economic interests of Russia; obtaining secret information about the reliability of trade and economic partners, the activities of international economic and financial organizations affecting the interests of Russia; ensuring the economic security of the country.

In terms of scientific and technical intelligence, the SVR's tasks have remained virtually the same. They consist of obtaining data on the latest achievements in the field of science and technology, especially military technologies and dual-use technologies, in the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the Russian Federation.

The organizational structure of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is built in accordance with the Law “On Foreign Intelligence”. The structure of the SVR (Fig. 3.3) includes operational, analytical and functional units (directorates, services, independent departments). For the first time in the practice of the Russian special services, a Bureau of Public Relations and Media Relations was created.

Rice. 3.3. Structure of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, formed on the basis of the 1st Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR