Operational level of management (lower). Great encyclopedia of oil and gas

Real estate management: from strategy to tactics, from tactics to operational tasks. Property management model.

The operation of the property management system covers three levels: strategic, tactical, operational.

Strategic – goal-setting. Within its framework, the goals of the long-term development of capital, the procedure for interaction of the highest center of competence with the owners of capital are determined, and contradictions between labor and capital and the owner of capital are resolved. A strategy plan is being developed and implemented

Tactical – design and normative. Here, the strategic goals of the enterprise are decomposed and the tactical goals of the enterprise are specified, resource standards are formulated, plans and budgets for their effective use are developed, and the demand for promising types of products is determined.

At the operational-executive level, tactical goals are decomposed, planned tasks and production schedules are developed, a systematic analysis of information is carried out, and targeted implementation of resources is carried out by combining living and materialized labor in space and time.

The relationship between the main levels of strategic, tactical and operational real estate management can be traced according to the diagram shown in Figure 3.2

To be successful, a management company must always focus on the market; it must determine its boundaries and establish control and regulation of a portfolio of assets that correspond to this market. At each level of the triangle, different questions can be answered. At the strategic level, it can be determined what goals the organization wants to achieve in accordance with the development of market relations.

The strategic triangle is also the basis for the management/leadership concept of a real estate organization. This means that all actions at different levels of management must be well coordinated with each other and at the same time collectively correspond to the set strategic goals.

The model is presented in the form of a triangle, which in turn is divided into several smaller triangles, grouped at three levels: strategic, tactical and operational. These three levels represent three levels of management, each of which has its own goals and scope of activity.

At the top of the triangle is the strategic level, where goals and objectives are determined. Key (main question): what do we want? Goals are usually defined by answering the following questions: What do we want to achieve over a long period of time? what do we want to achieve? What kind of clients do we want to work with? We formulate our objectives by solving the following questions: what level of profit do we want to achieve? What level of risk can we afford or be willing to bear in order to achieve a given level of profit? What minimum annual income can we afford in order to ensure the very existence of the management company’s business?

The content of the intermediate level consists of managing tactical tasks. This level of management answers the question: what can we do? Every strategy requires financial and administrative means to implement it. The tactical level addresses issues such as financial management (raising funds and controlling cash flows), creating a structure to ensure effective asset management, monitoring changes in market conditions, and so on. The following questions arise here: do we have sufficient internal funds to finance the desired real estate portfolio (changes in it); do we have access to external funds for this? Do we have sufficient management capacity to monitor the project and maintain it in good condition? Do we have an information structure that allows us to monitor the market and make timely decisions? The task of real estate management at the tactical level is not simply to manage the real estate itself, but also to organize the business in such a way that it allows you to carry out the intended strategy.

The lowest, but extremely important level is operational. It is closest to end consumers and, therefore, to the market. This level of management is basically concerned with the question, how can we achieve our objectives? How to keep property in good condition, ensuring a level of quality that meets market demand? How do we communicate with our clients? etc.

One of the main economic methods used at the management company level is planning. It involves making decisions in advance, that is, what should be done, who will do it, who will be responsible for the result obtained. It can be argued that planning establishes a connection between the existing state of affairs and the one to be achieved. It makes it possible to realize the opportunities provided and minimize future risk. The place of planning among other management methods is determined, firstly, by the fact that the results of planning directly determine the content of other management functions, and secondly, by the fact that it is at this stage that the goals of the enterprise are formed and the means of achieving these goals are determined. Thus, the purpose of planning is to simplify the achievement of enterprise goals by:

eliminating the negative effect of uncertainty in the external and internal environment of the project;

focusing managers' attention on the main management tasks;

achieving effective management through optimal resource allocation;

facilitating organizational, motivational and control activities of management.

The general process of planning an organization's activities can be presented in the form of a diagram.

Different plans are developed to achieve different goals. Depending on the goals they serve, the following types of plans can be distinguished: strategic, tactical and operational.

Strategic plans (long-term) are drawn up for 5-10, 10-12 years; they reflect global goals and the main stages of their achievement. These plans do not specify methods for achieving management goals, but only determine the general policy and general direction of management activities, set priorities and allocate available resources. They must take into account the state and prospects for the development of the external environment, as well as their own advantages and disadvantages, that is, the internal environment of the project.

Operational plans (short-term) - are current in nature, they are developed for various calendar periods up to one year inclusive. The plans' indicators are extremely specific. If strategic plans answer the question: “What do we want to achieve in the future?”, then operational plans answer the question: “How to achieve our goals?”

Tactical plans (medium-term) serve to link strategy and operational activities; they are drawn up for 3-5 years and cover all main aspects of project management activities (production, marketing, finance, personnel, research and computer research).

Planning allows you to:

improve coordination of management activities;

take into account rapid changes in the external environment;

realize favorable opportunities for the project;

improve information exchange in management;

optimally allocate resources;

strictly define the duties and responsibilities of management participants;

stimulate better performance of work by employees, greater validity of decisions made by managers, and their implementation;

improve management control.

The planning process is a tool that facilitates management decision making. There are four main functions of management activities within the planning process: resource allocation, adaptation to the external environment, internal coordination and organizational strategic foresight.

Resource allocation involves the allocation of scarce organizational resources such as funds, management personnel, and technological expertise.

Adaptation to the external environment covers all actions that improve the organization's relationship with its environment. Organizations need to adapt to both external opportunities and possible threats, identify relevant situations and ensure that strategy is effectively adapted to environmental conditions. Planning for successful enterprises allows you to create new opportunities through the development of better production systems, through interaction with government and society at large, and so on.

Internal coordination is the coordination of an organization's activities, taking into account its strengths and weaknesses in order to achieve effective integration of internal operations in organizations, large or small, and is an integral part of the activities of managers.

Consciousness of organizational strategies involves systematically developing the thinking of managers by creating an organization that is able to learn from past strategic decisions. The ability to learn from experience allows an organization to adjust its strategic direction and improve its strategic management proficiency. The sustained success of organizations is driven by management's continued commitment to learning from past experiences and anticipating the future.

Today, organizations have to achieve their goals in a dynamic, changing and uncertain environment. A belief system that allows an organization to achieve its goals in a dynamic, changing and uncertain environment is called the concept of strategic management.

Reflections on the future of the project, strategy and business plan solve similar problems, but do this only with varying degrees of detail and formalization.

In modern conditions, a business plan is developed mainly for the purpose of obtaining financing. However, fairly large investors are gradually beginning to come to the conclusion that the qualified preparation of a concept plan and business plan is a necessary condition for effective project management.

The investor clearly understands that if you cannot make a normal business plan, then you will certainly not be able to start a business.

The concept plan and business plan are a product of internal activities, although the consumer is most often external counterparties: investors, creditors, business partners.

Conditions under which the developed concept plan and business plan can be considered untenable:

“deafness” of Russian managers to key issues to key issues of project management, including management as one of the first, if not the first guarantee of the profitability of the enterprise (this attitude arises due to the denial of the old directive planning, and the strong conviction that someone must give money: not the state, but a foreign investor); they say “We need money, not a business plan”;

the lack of a methodology for working with a business plan turns it into a museum value, a historical relic the very next day after its creation;

lack of preparation for working in foreign markets, lack of a minimum audit of the consultant you are working with, and the presence of the euphoria of easy money.

Work on business planning and attracting financial investments are not simple projects; they require a position and knowledge of the subject.

Strategic management involves the collection and analysis of strategically important information, the development of a strategy, its translation into a specific program of action, followed by the organization of controlling.

Property management is based on the construction of a management strategy. The property management strategy should be understood as the correspondence between the characteristics of the property and those opportunities that determine its position in the market and in the real estate portfolio.

The main point of the strategy is to indicate to the organization a reliable course of property management in the existing conditions. When an organization has strong confidence in its actions, it tends to achieve very good results. With the adoption of a property management strategy, the main problems are removed, and people, having decided on the main thing, instead of discussing the choice of the best option for using the property, pay attention to the details - specific measures to improve management efficiency, customer service, planning income and expenses of the property. Thus, the adopted strategy eliminates uncertainty in management, ensuring its regularity and controllability. In this sense, it is akin to a theory that simplifies and explains the world and facilitates the timely adoption of adequate management decisions. The managerial validity of a management strategy is a factor through the prism of which all possible options are passed through. Moreover, it has two components – compliance of the strategy with the owner’s goals and available management resources.

Every manager who thinks about strategy must be a bit of a philosopher. Thanks to this quality, he overcomes two significant obstacles that constantly arise in management, especially in strategic management. The first is the limited information field in which decisions must be made, the second is the so-called chicken and egg problem, when it is not clear where the beginning and end of strategy development are.

However, there is a sequence of steps in the strategic planning process, where everything has a strictly defined place (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Model of strategic planning and management

In the model of strategic management of a real estate property, three main stages can be distinguished:

assessment of factors shaping management strategy;

formation of a facility management strategy;

assessment and implementation of facility management strategy.

At the first stage of strategic planning, an analysis of the business “today” is carried out - these are strategic diagnostics, SWOT analysis, a series of examinations, marketing research of the project’s market environment and monitoring of the external environment. At the next stage of the procedure, it is necessary to distribute planning functions between departments, draw up a program of activities (who should do what and when), a budget system for a given period (who should do what, when and how much it will cost) (Table 3.2.1).

Table 3.2.1 – Distribution of strategic planning functions between company divisions

In practice, this ideal framework does not serve as a rigid guide, but rather as a guide to support the iterative process of strategy development. So you can first formulate a strategy based on intuition, and then engage in analysis, and not in full, only financial. Then clarify the strategy, model the business “tomorrow” and develop a transition program. In the next iteration, marketing research may be included in the analysis block - and again moving in a circle.

More detailed content of the stages of the presented model is given below.

Gradefactors shaping management strategy

Many factors influence the determination of a company's strategy. The interaction of these factors is specific to each industry and company and always changes over time. The main emphasis in building a real estate management strategy is on assessing external and internal environmental factors. The first includes the current state and development trends of the real estate market, existing regulations, the second - the condition of the property and available management resources. The choice of strategy for using a real estate property is determined by the ability of the market to accept this strategy, the possibility of implementing this strategy in terms of the potential of the location of the property, legislative permission, technical condition of the property, economic and managerial feasibility.

Real estate market monitoring and analysis

An analysis of the market's ability to adopt a particular real estate management strategy is carried out to determine how much a particular strategy fits into the nature of supply and demand in the real estate market.

For this purpose, within the framework of the servicing concept, research (analysis) and monitoring of the real estate market are carried out. Research (analysis) of the real estate market is an independent type of activity aimed at providing objective information to decision-makers on carrying out certain operations on the market. During this analysis, the location (situs) of the property, the nature of development and the state of the regional economy, the supply of commercial real estate, possible competitors and competing properties, etc. are studied. Thus, the ratio of supply and demand for commercial real estate is assessed and a conclusion is drawn about the feasibility of an appropriate property management strategy.

Market research can be carried out for various private purposes and represent an element, a stage of other types of activities:

marketing research to promote the property on the market;

investment activities in order to assess the effectiveness of investment decisions;

analysis and forecasting of market development trends - to develop strategic decisions for business development.

Thus, depending on the goals of the analysis, the following areas of studying the real estate market can be distinguished:

Analysis of the price situation in order to determine the average market rental rate by type of real estate.

Analysis of market conditions, determining the volume of demand and supply of rental services for commercial real estate, trends and dynamics of market development.

Marketing market analysis to determine the most effective measures to promote a property on the market.

Market analysis to determine the market value of a property.

Analysis of the effectiveness of real estate investments in order to determine the most profitable investment options.

In turn, each area of ​​market research involves solving a number of subtasks.

The diagram shown in Figure 3.4 gives an idea of ​​the scale of the work required.

Each market research task can be solved independently or in mutual connection. The essence of the connection is that some of the stages are common to several directions and some directions use the results obtained by others. The most typical example of a general task is assessing and forecasting the price situation in the real estate market. It is key in the entire market analysis and is highlighted in the first direction. At the same time, when forecasting prices, it is necessary to know the trends in market conditions, that is, use the results of the second direction. Further, when analyzing and forecasting the state of the market, marketing efficiency, profitability and cost of real estate, investment efficiency, the results of the first direction are necessary.

As part of the servicing concept, market analysis and monitoring should be carried out on an ongoing, targeted basis. This requirement is dictated both by the specifics of the real estate market, which is undergoing constant changes, and by the variety of tasks in its study. Under these conditions, serious market research cannot be carried out spontaneously, from time to time.

Studying the almost century-long history of the functioning of real estate markets in developed countries of the world, we can come to the conclusion that insufficient attention paid to the quality of analytical work is one of the main reasons for most major crises in real estate markets. A typical example is the crisis in the US real estate market in the late 80s and early 90s. As experts note, excessive and disorderly investment in new construction has led to an oversaturation of the market and, accordingly, to a lack of market demand for a large number of projects for which loans were issued. At the core of this situation were unrealistic market expectations stemming from poor analysis incentive structures, weak analysis methodology, and incomplete data describing current conditions. Considering the prospects for the development of the real estate market in Russia, we can assume that the absence of potential crises is an overly optimistic scenario. However, the consequences of such crises may be less significant if today, at the stage of active market development, some general principles and requirements for analytical research are formulated and introduced into everyday practice, on the basis of which investment decisions will be made. Not only the threat of crises, but also current everyday problems - increasing competition, decreasing opportunities for obtaining short-term excess profits, the beginning of the implementation of long-term and capital-intensive commercial real estate development projects, the entry of foreign investors into the market with high demands for substantiating decisions, etc. - objectively indicate that the importance of qualitative analysis in the Russian real estate markets will in the near future become increasingly important. (Tarasevich E.I. Fundamentals of methodology for analyzing the real estate market//Problems of real estate. Scientific electronic journal. - 1999. - Issue 3. - pp. 3-4.)

Individual firms that consider renting out temporarily empty premises as a side activity may from time to time turn to collecting information about their competitors, demand for commercial space, etc., that is, solve separate subtasks of real estate market research. But a high-quality and comprehensive solution to the entire range of market analysis tasks is possible only within the framework of a large organization. Only commercial companies for which information and analytical business is the main one, or specialized information and analytical divisions of large companies operating in the real estate market can afford to create complex research tools that must be operated by highly professional analysts.

Formation of a facility management strategy

After the factors shaping the strategy have been analyzed, the period of direct creation of a real estate management strategy begins.

The formation of a real estate management strategy is a creative process that is difficult to formalize; here, more than anywhere else, the role of the company’s founders and its top management is great.

However, there are a number of points worth paying special attention to. Experience shows that in the process of determining a property management strategy, it is necessary to clarify the following issues:

choosing the best and most effective option for using the property;

determination of the subject of real estate management;

identifying the main elements of a marketing strategy;

determining the place of the property in the company’s product and market strategy.

Tactical level

If we go back to the Cold War example of a potential battle between anti-tank missiles and advancing armored forces, and take it to the next, tactical level of strategy, the picture becomes clearer and broader. Broader - because we no longer simplify this situation, we do not see it as a simple duel: instead, we must consider the clashes of entire units, in which, on the one hand, there are many missile crews, and on the other, a sufficient number of armored vehicles. And this picture will be more complete, because we will no longer analyze the collision of anti-tank missiles and armored vehicles as if it were a test experiment, with crews and crews that could well consist of robots. At the tactical level we encounter the human dimension of war in its entirety.

But, first of all, there is the physical battle arena: a certain area, its topography and vegetation. There are no large mountains in central Germany where the front lines might lie, but the plain is mostly bordered by hills and depressions. Any uneven terrain can be important for infantry, as it provides an opportunity to hide. There are many hidden passages that small advancing columns of Soviet armor could use to suddenly appear in front of ATGMs at close range, thereby denying them a huge range advantage over machine guns. In extreme cases, visible targets could appear at such a short distance that the anti-tank missile could not be used at all: after all, most models have both minimum and maximum firing distances, since after launch the missile must be caught and guided by the aiming mechanism at the target range ( anti-tank missiles also have a minimum firing distance, set by a fuse designed for a certain time to protect the crew from the explosion).

Besides, Germany is not a desert. There is vegetation everywhere that could hide infantry with ATGMs, initially masking their presence. Along with the minimal cover provided by the terrain itself, vital protection from direct fire could be found there. In addition, due to the availability of some time before the start of the battle, the terrain and vegetation on it could not only be used in its natural form, but also their useful properties could be enhanced with fortifications and minefields. Bulldozers and excavators, or even better, specialized military engineering vehicles with devices for digging trenches and ditches, or even buckets and saws, can turn the area into a fortified zone. No new developments in weapons technology have eliminated the original advantage of fighting under cover, protecting against mounted fire from howitzers and mortars, and fighting from firing positions fortified by trenches, as well as from behind anti-tank ditches. And given even more time, it would be possible to erect solid and permanent barriers to protect against attacks by military equipment, with bunkers made of durable types of concrete and other structures, contrary to all the prejudices that arose after the failure of the Maginot Line. It would take significantly less time to strengthen the defense with anti-tank mines. Much of this can be done manually, but it will be much faster if you lay mines using special minelayers or even scatter them with missiles right in front of the advancing armored vehicles. However, firing positions should not be too visible against the natural or urban landscape, otherwise they will become obvious and easy targets for attackers, and minefields not protected by fire can be cleared without hindrance.

At this level of strategy, such things can be decisive in themselves. Therefore, we must recognize that a completely new factor influences defeat or success: skill - not only in the mechanical handling of weapons (this was already taken for granted at the technical level), but a much more subtle, tactical skill necessary to use advantages of the terrain during the redeployment of troops. What is important here is the correct choice and placement of weapons directed against a particular enemy, at one time or another, in one place or another. And then such qualities as innate abilities, as well as military training and fitness, become extremely important: both the crews of armored vehicles and the crews of anti-tank missiles opposing them. Do they know how to act on the battlefield in such a way as to protect themselves and cause harm to the enemy? Can their junior commanders quickly “read” the terrain and the immediate battle situation? Will they be able to intuitively choose the best sectors of fire or the best advance paths?

Leadership, morale, luck

Skill is undoubtedly a personal quality, but the outcome of the battle is decided by the crews of armored vehicles and missile crews - that is, groups, no matter how small they are. Therefore, what is taken into account here is not personal skill, but the skill successfully applied by groups as a whole - and this depends on the competence of their commanders. How were the ATGM infantry commanders selected for their tactical abilities or for obedience rather than talent? Are junior armor officers true leaders willing to act on their own initiative, or are they merely following senior officers in the chain of command?

But competent leadership is not enough without soldiers willing to face danger. When the tactical battle begins - with terrifying artillery salvoes, with the ominous chatter of machine guns, with the deadly explosions of mortar shells; when the earth seems to be about to shoot up from an explosion and fly into the sky; when either an armored vehicle or a neighboring tank is hit when they burn or explode; when the infantrymen of the rocket crews see that their comrades, a moment ago safe and sound, are killed or wounded - that is, once the real battle begins, we discover that many more factors determine its outcome than one skillful leadership.

Natural instinct causes crews of attacking armored vehicles to linger in whatever safe shelter the terrain affords them, rather than continue advancing into the unknown terrain that lies before them, against an unseen enemy and his deadly missiles. And the same powerful instinct forces the infantry to flee rather than hold their positions as the steel monsters advance mercilessly upon them. And the missile launchers will seem negligibly weak and unreliable, in contrast to the mathematical certainty that in a few minutes the defenders will be crushed by the tracks of oncoming tanks and infantry fighting vehicles if they cannot be hit all, and these few minutes are not enough to quickly estimate the real number attackers.

Three great “intangible factors” make it possible to overcome the instinct of self-preservation and make it possible for soldiers to participate in a real battle. These factors are commonly cultivated by all the armies of the world through drill on the parade ground (to make obedience automatic), through speeches, calls, songs and flags (to instill pride.), and through punishments and rewards: personal morale, group discipline and cohesion divisions. The most important of these decidedly important but unmeasurable factors is usually the cohesion of a small unit, because the willingness of men to fight for each other withstands the terrifying impact of battle far better than all other sources of morale.

Therefore, at the tactical level of strategy, intangible factors such as skill, leadership, morale, discipline and unit cohesion form a coherent whole and usually determine the outcome of the battle. This is why estimates of the military balance of power that do not go beyond the technical level are so systematically erroneous: when comparing lists of weapons on one side and the other, they exclude with seductive precision the largest part of the whole from this comparison.

There is another factor that has a strong influence within any tactical skirmish: luck, that is, chance and probability. One side would be lucky if the other side's soldiers were tired from lack of sleep, sick from spoiled food, exhausted from food shortages, or mortally frightened from some previous battle. Let's not forget about the climate. In Central Europe, haze or thick fog is common for many months of the year. This allows tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to suddenly appear in front of the defenders, leaving them with little time to fire a single missile, even if the defenders manage to stay put rather than flee, demoralized by the sudden approach of the invisible, roaring armored vehicles.

Asymmetry of attack and retreat

Everything that counts at the tactical level has its counterparts in other types of military operations: in the sky and at sea, just as on land. But do the factors of terrain, skill, leadership, morale and luck affect both sides equally? Having understood the need to take these factors into account, will we change the categorical judgments that we made after familiarizing ourselves with the combat characteristics of weapons at a technical level? Will we reconsider the conclusion that infantry armed with ATGMs can operate very effectively against Soviet armored forces in defense of Central Europe? The answer to these questions is a resounding yes.

First, the needs of the two parties are not the same. Soviet armored forces only need to move forward to accomplish their mission. Most crews would only have to drive their vehicles and fire their weapons through narrow-view sights; while they would be protected from most of the terrifying scenes and sounds of battle by armored plates and roaring engines. To move in the right direction and make good use of the terrain, leadership is, of course, necessary, and this must be provided by the junior officers at the head of the columns; but such initiative is not required from armored vehicle crews.

On the contrary, defensive infantry with ATGMs cannot muffle their instinctive reactions by mechanically limiting the field of vision of what is happening around the battle; to fully participate in the battle, they need to see and hear what is happening. Its soldiers must remain active and alert to detect their targets from afar, despite the darkness and fog and possible smoke, natural or man-made. They must then calmly take aim at the target and calmly choose the moment to launch. And this is a delicate question. Although it is better to open fire from the furthest distance, it turns out that the longer the distance to the target, the more likely it is that there will be “dead space” in which the advancing tank can hide long enough to avoid aiming the missile flying at it. After launch, the operator must keep the moving target in sight for the long seconds of the missile's flight (the first fire-and-forget missiles are only now being produced). And throughout this entire procedure, from detection to impact, the soldiers operating the missiles must carry out their difficult tasks while all their senses are assaulted by the sounds and scenes of battle, and to be distracted even for a second means to lose control of the flying missile.

If there are no strong fortifications, a huge asymmetry in physical security arises. Armored vehicles are vulnerable only to missiles, other tanks and mines, but the defenders are vulnerable to all types of weapons on the battlefield: machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, tank guns and, most importantly, to support artillery fire fired in front of the advancing armored vehicles. In addition to death and injury, all of these types of fire can incapacitate rocket-equipped infantry tactically, forcing men to seek cover rather than engage targets.

In reality, not only their own feelings, but also their thoughts work against the defenders. The advancing armored unit is pressed from behind by others following it. Apart from the general direction of attack, the mission of armored units is unrestricted, and the decisions of their commanders and crew members are only slightly influenced by the structure of the defense opposing them; they know very little about it and, of course, cannot keep calculations. But the defenders have the full opportunity to make the appropriate calculations: even with full visibility, the maximum combat range for them does not exceed 4000 meters; If enemy equipment advances at a speed of only 15 kilometers per hour, then the infantry will have only 16 minutes to shoot before tanks and combat vehicles crush it. And if visibility is reduced by haze or, even more, fog, then the combat distance is reduced, and with it the time available for firing. In Central Europe, even figures of 1,500 meters and six minutes may be considered overly optimistic. Theoretically, each missile crew could fire at a new target every minute - something that is sometimes done at peacetime firing ranges. But in real combat, this sequence, from target detection to its destruction, allows for a maximum of one shot per two minutes, and the technical probability of an accurate hit with a shot is 38 percent, if no enemy fire reduces the effectiveness of the crew's actions.

Therefore, the defenders, in order to decide whether they can hold the line of defense or whether retreat is the only alternative to death or captivity, must estimate how many tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are advancing on them. If there is more than one vehicle for every missile crew that survives shelling and direct fire, the infantrymen will have to realize that they will lose their life or freedom in the next few minutes. Since in our conditional case the enemy was the Soviet army, and by the will of fate the defenders found themselves in front of its columns, they should expect the worst: there may not be very many tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in the field of view, but this is only the beginning - soon other vehicles will appear behind them , and there will be more of them. This abundance of armored vehicles is the very reason why the concept of infantry armed with ATGMs, brought to the fore, can only result in a demoralizing tactical situation, the only way out of which would be not to stand still and fight, but to fire a missile or two and quickly retreat .

For all these reasons, the original conclusion drawn at the technical level has changed greatly. Looking at the engagement at the tactical level, we see that the defenders can no longer hope to destroy a tank costing a hundred times as much as one missile with only 2.56 missiles, or an infantry fighting vehicle costing at least 15 times as much as one missile with the cost of only 1.8 missiles, and at the same time achieve an excellent ratio of 1:39 for tanks and 1:8 for infantry fighting vehicles. Part of the infantry, along with its rocket launchers, does not have time to enter the battle, perishing under pre-emptive fire from artillery and mortars, as well as under direct fire; the other unit is unable to detect and hit at least one target within a few minutes of combat time due to rising smoke; the third part loses control of the missiles already flying towards the target due to the shock wave and shock from the explosions around.

So how many rocket launchers would then be needed in tactical reality to destroy a tank or infantry fighting vehicle? Ten or twenty, as the experience of the Middle East suggests? Or more because Central Europe doesn't have such great visibility? Since the cost differences are so large, the cost ratio will probably remain favorable for rocket calculations, but not on such a significant scale. Therefore, our conclusion, drawn at the tactical level (albeit preliminary), is that the concept of infantry armed with ATGMs is not nearly as promising as it initially seemed at the technical level. And now we know that its success will depend in an extremely high degree on the quality of the people participating in the battle. The intangible factors of morale, discipline, and cohesion are always more important in battle than the material factors, but this is especially true here because defenders must withstand far more stress than attackers—a significant asymmetry that constitutes a key flaw in this concept.

So we discover that the merits of the proposal to assign a major role to infantry armed with ATGMs actually depended on what previously might have seemed like just an administrative detail. Will the ATGM-equipped infantry be staffed by local units made up of friends and neighbors, mutually indebted, tested for compatibility and suitability, and as thoroughly trained as off-duty training will allow? Or will reservists who served on active duty many years ago be called up from all over the country, and they will meet each other only just before the start of the battle? Or should the ATGM-equipped infantry be an elite corps of carefully selected young men, trained and managed to ensure the highest morale? But if this is so, what considerations should the rich nations of NATO have in selecting their best men to fight with cheap weapons against their Warsaw Pact enemies, who are much poorer but have much heavier weapons?

Thus, at the tactical level of strategy we encounter all the complexities of the human dimension of combat as it unfolds within the unique context of time and place. Since weather and other circumstances are variable, even two troops, equally equipped and armed, operating in a similar manner on the same ground, cannot fight exactly the same battles twice and achieve exactly the same result. True, the chances cancel each other out, so by relying on probability estimates derived from observations of many events (weapon accuracy, climate characteristics), we can reach more reliable conclusions at the tactical level - but even this is only possible for specific troops with a specific weapons, as well as with specific characteristics of human potential.

The wisdom of tactical instruction in the detailed craft of war can neither go too far nor last too long. There is nothing, right or wrong, that does not depend on the specific character of the opponents and the specific action of the weapon. This or that method of attacking an enemy outpost, flying to intercept, or attacking an enemy ship can be either suicidally daring or overly timid, depending on the characteristics of the opposing forces. Therefore, tactics manuals must be rewritten whenever a significant new weapon appears, transforming what was considered unusual into mere commonplace, and what was once quite reliable into unacceptably dangerous. And now, when we read the ancient texts on tactics, we extract from them advice of lasting value, but it would be vain to expect that they contain much more than mere self-evidence. And if we read the much less interesting tactical manuals from the two world wars, we find that they are equally out of date. Therefore, tactics is an activity only for professionals operating at a given time, just as any normative “strategics” advocating this or that line of behavior for this or that country, at best, has only a temporary significance - unlike strategy as such, which does not prescribe anything, but only describes unchanging phenomena that exist regardless of whether we know about them or not.

Limits of Tactics

In our "photographic" view of the encounter between rocket-armed infantry and advancing armored forces, we allowed no changes in tactics on either side. There was no reaction to success or failure that could give rise to further reactions on one side or the other. It was simply assumed that both would adhere to simple tactics of frontal attack and frontal defense, even if due attention was paid to the terrain.

This simplification may be true in the event of an initial engagement between the first wave of advancing Soviet armor and a defensive line of ATGM-equipped infantry. But if the defense succeeds in repelling this first attack, a reaction will inevitably follow: either suppress the defense with heavier artillery fire, or bypass it in some other way. The defense will also be able to react, taking advantage of the time it has gained thanks to its first success. It will either move to another position, or send out groups of “hunters” with anti-tank missiles if there is suitable terrain or vegetation cover where they could hide, or plan an ambush into which the next wave of attack can be missed, and then hit from behind . This will begin a new round of battle.

The particular troops we have been considering are not, however, independent agents pursuing their own goals. What for them is the battle in its entirety, what actually constitutes their entire existence at this time, is only a fragment of the whole battle for the highest levels of command and for the national authorities on both sides. They made the plans and decisions that led to this fight. When combat begins, they try to maintain control of the battle by reacting to the results that arise. They can reinforce artillery or provide air support to units already engaged in combat. Sometimes these units are sacrificed and left to fight unassisted, either to use their remaining deterrent power on the defensive, or to maintain the vector of attack on the offensive - while their strength dwindles and they are reduced to mere appearance . When the troops already on the battlefield are fully engaged in the battle and perhaps absorbed in the struggle for their own survival, the higher levels can confidently control only those new forces that they send into battle: freely direct them to new defensive positions or, if it It’s about attacking new attack vectors. Even with extensive means of communication, instantaneous control over units already engaged in battle with the enemy is impossible, for then what can be done and what cannot be done must depend on what the enemy can and cannot do.

Then the relationship between action and reaction is no longer reduced to the tactical level. We need a completely different, much broader perspective to continue our research. In this perspective, the nuances associated with local conditions lose their significance when the entire host of enemy forces is considered on a much larger scale. To do this we must move to the next level of strategy, first noting that while we have considered the episode of land war, in any other type of warfare, including those inaccurately called "strategic" - both in the past, and in the future, and at sea, both in the air, and even in space, there must be its own tactical level.