Explosion at the SSHPP. Analysis of social protection of persons affected by man-made and radiation disasters

The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station shocked the entire country. Its surprise, scale and mystery attracted the attention of many people. Many versions have appeared, from completely fantastic to completely plausible, trying to explain what happened. On October 3, 2009, the Act of the Rostechnadzor commission was published, and on December 21, 2009, the results of the investigation of the parliamentary commission were published. On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee completed its own investigation into the causes of the incident, bringing charges against the management and technical staff of the station. It would seem that everything is clear - these are the technical reasons for what happened, these are the alleged culprits. However, everything is not so simple.

If you expect to see in this message some kind of “revealing,” a story about the insidious authorities hiding the truth, about the fact that everything was stolen, etc. - I have to disappoint, this will not happen. There will be a serious analysis, rich in a number of technical terms. Without this, alas, there is no way. There will be many letters and few pictures. However, I will try to make the presentation as popular as possible.

For quite a long time I did not have any formed opinion about the causes of the accident. Despite my long-standing fascination with hydropower, I did not feel competent in a number of rather specific technical issues. Back at the end of 2009, I wrote an article on Wikipedia about the accident, where I carefully presented information from the Rostechnadzor Act. There were some points in the Act that alarmed me even then, but I attributed them to my own incompetence. But in general, the reasons were clear; in the Act - www.sshges.rushydro.ru/file/main/sshges/p ress/news-materials/doc/Act6.pdf they are stated as follows:
“Due to the repeated occurrence of additional variable loads on the hydraulic unit associated with transitions through the non-recommended zone, fatigue damage to the hydraulic unit attachment points, including the turbine cover, formed and developed. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the tearing of the turbine cover and depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit... a relative increase in the vibration of the GA-2 turbine bearing was observed by approximately 4 times... In this situation, in order to ensure safe operation, the chief engineer of the SShHPP had to make a decision to stop the GA-2 and research into the causes of vibration”
Simply put, the hydraulic unit was destroyed by the vibrations that arose when it passed through the non-recommended zone. At the same time, the hydraulic unit signaled its abnormal condition with increased vibration that exceeded permissible standards, to which the personnel did not pay attention.

However, I quickly noticed that this explanation does not quite suit industry experts. This manifested itself in personal conversations, in some publicly spoken phrases. It was felt that the industry was comprehending what had happened, and sooner or later the results of this comprehension would be presented. Which, in fact, happened a year and a half after the incident.
On February 2, 2011, a detailed article “On vibration at unit No. 2 of the SSHHPP before the accident” was published on the Taiga.info resource at tayga.info/details/2011/02/02/~102283. Discussion” by Alexander Klyukach, an engineer at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, one of those accused of the incident.
At the same time, in the February issue of the journal “Hydraulic Engineering” (this is the leading scientific and technical journal in the field of hydraulic engineering and hydropower) an article was published by A.P. Karpik, A.P. Epifanov (both doctors of technical sciences) and N.I. Stefanenko . (candidate of technical sciences, head of the monitoring service of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) entitled “On the issue of the causes of the accident and assessment of the condition of the arch-gravity dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP.”

Both of these works contain scientifically formulated, and therefore not entirely understandable to a reader unfamiliar with the topic, harsh criticism of the conclusions of the Rostechnadzor Act. Due to their specific nature, they went largely unnoticed. But they made me think very seriously.
On May 19-20, 2011, the conference “Improving the efficiency of the safety management system for hydroelectric power plants” was held. This event was conceived as an attempt by industry specialists to understand the reasons for what happened at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, an attempt to draw conclusions so that this would not happen again. I will say right away that it seems to me that this result was achieved.
I had the opportunity to attend this conference. It brought together the elite of domestic hydropower and hydraulic engineering - prominent scientists, specialists from design organizations and factories, leading engineers of hydroelectric power plants - more than 150 people in total, about 50 reports. I sat in plenary sessions and rushed between five round tables that were held at the same time; Fortunately, I was able to attend the most important reports. I listened to what these people said in reports, discussions and on the sidelines. And I realized one thing. They do not believe the Rostekhnadzor Act. Not everything, of course, but a number of its fundamental provisions.
The pieces of the mosaic in my head came together into a single picture.

Data

So let's take a look at the facts. And they are like this:
1. The immediate technical cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of the studs securing the cover of hydraulic unit No. 2 (HA No. 2). The fact of the presence of fatigue cracks was established by examining studs at TsNIITMASH, whose specialist spoke at the conference. A number of important details:
A. At the time of the accident, the average degree of fatigue damage in the studs was about 60-65%. The residual load-bearing capacity of the studs actually corresponded to the loads on the turbine, i.e. was exhausted. An accident could occur at any time during completely normal operation of the turbine.
b. Fatigue failures developed gradually over a long period of time, more than one year. This follows from the presence of rust in the cracks, as well as the presence of separate zones of destruction. Apparently, fatigue damage intensified after operations to tighten the nuts, which were carried out, in particular, during major repairs (there were four of them).
All this clearly puts an end to all versions of the accident, implying as its root cause some powerful abnormal impact on the hydraulic unit at the time of the accident - water hammer, terrorist attack, electrodynamic impact. There was simply no need for them.

2. After the accident, the studs of other hydraulic units of the station were examined for cracks. In particular, the studs of hydraulic unit No. 1 were examined with ultrasound by the same TsNIITMASH. According to his representative, they were fully confident that they would see approximately the same pattern of fatigue failure on hydraulic unit No. 1. However, not a single crack was found in the studs of hydraulic unit No. 1. As far as I know, studs of other hydraulic units have been studied, with the same result.

This means the following. Transitions of the hydraulic unit through the non-recommended zone, named as the main reason for the development of fatigue failures in the Rostekhnadzor Act, could not have been the cause of the accident. Other hydraulic units passed through this zone no less, if not more, than hydraulic unit No. 2; the Act itself states that in 2009, hydraulic unit No. 2 worked in this zone for a total of only 46 minutes, and hydraulic unit No. 4 - twice as long, 1 hour 38 minutes, but no fatigue damage was found in the studs of hydraulic unit No. 4. According to experts from the country's leading institute in the field of hydraulic turbines, TsKTI, vibrations in the non-recommended area could not cause the destruction of the studs.

About vibration of hydraulic unit No. 2

Separately, we should dwell on the issue of the vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident, because the fact of its presence is primarily the basis for the accusations against the station personnel. The Act provides a graph of vibration of the hydraulic unit measured by the TP R NB sensor - radial vibrations of the turbine bearing, tailwater. Here he is:

It seems that everything is obvious - here it is, the growth of transcendental vibrations. However, if you think about it, the question arises - was this the only sensor on this turbine? The answer is contained in Klyukach’s article - no, there were 10 of these sensors on the turbine. Only one sensor showed extreme vibration, while others installed next to it and taking measurements in the same direction showed the norm. Moreover, this sensor showed exorbitant vibration even when the hydraulic unit was stopped, which makes its readings obviously unreliable. But it was these faulty and unreliable testimonies that formed the basis for the accusations of specific people.

The unreliability of the readings from the TP R NB sensor and the normal vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 is confirmed by other sources. The former chief engineer and director of the station, now the chief technical inspector of JSC RusHydro, Valentin Stafievsky, speaks about this in Lev Gordon’s book “The Sayan Miracle”. Leading specialists from ORGRES, the parent organization dealing with the issue of vibration control of power equipment, spoke about this in their report. There is also independent confirmation - a graph of dam vibrations (seismogram), recorded by an automatic seismic station installed on the dam.
Here is this seismogram given in the above article in “Hydraulic Engineering”:

The seismic station is highly accurate; it “catch” changes in the operating mode of hydraulic units - their start-up, shutdown, transition through an unrecommended zone. The section between numbers 1 and 2, duration 32.5 s, is the period of destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2, between 2 and 3, duration 74 - the impact of water flow on the turbine room, after 3 - vibrations caused by the uncontrolled acceleration of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9. Until the moment accidents, i.e. up to number 1, the vibration graph is smooth, due to background vibrations of the dam from hydraulic units operating in normal mode. There are no prohibitive vibrations that make the floor shake.

All of the above means that hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident did not have excessive vibrations detected by monitoring equipment, and accordingly, the station personnel had no reason to stop it.

About the probable causes of stud failure

So, the conclusions of the Rostekhnadzor Act are doubtful. Why did the studs fail? There are two versions on this matter. Each of them has its own strengths and weaknesses.
The first version, expressed in particular in the same article in “Hydraulic Engineering”, is that fatigue failures arose during the operation of hydraulic pump No. 2 with a temporary impeller. It is known that GA No. 2 from 1979 to 1986, for a total of about 20 thousand hours, worked at reduced pressures with a replaceable impeller. At the same time, there was a hydraulic imbalance of the impeller and significant vibrations that exceeded the permissible values. It is possible that during major repairs the already weakened studs were “tightened”, which accelerated their further destruction - but it is no longer possible to prove this.
The second version, which the TsKTI specialists adhere to, is that the studs destroyed high-frequency vibrations that arose during normal operation of the hydraulic unit in the recommended zone, which were not detected by existing sensors, and which were generally quite poorly studied.

I will not now analyze in detail the strengths and weaknesses of these versions, they are very highly specialized, and in order to confirm or refute them, additional research is required, which, as far as I know, is underway. But both of them deny the guilt of the station personnel and management working at the time of the accident.

Analogues

Very similar accidents, but with less consequences, occurred at hydroelectric power stations in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. But the closest thing is the accident at the Nurek hydroelectric station in Tajikistan.


Turbine room of Nurek hydroelectric power station. Photo from here - www.ljplus.ru/img4/p/i/pigger_2/t-ges09.j pg

On July 9, 1983, station personnel heard a blow and saw a stream of water coming out of the turbine shaft. The hydraulic unit was stopped and the pre-turbine valve was closed. The lower premises of the station were flooded with approximately two meters of water.
Upon inspection, it turned out that out of 72 studs, 50 were broken. The turbine had already begun its ascent, but was stopped at the very beginning.
The cause of the accident was said to be fatigue failure of the studs due to insufficient tightening. Since then, at the Tajik hydroelectric power stations - Nurek and Baipazinskaya, ultrasonic testing of studs has been mandatory twice a year. It was also carried out at the Zelenchuk hydroelectric power station, the core of which consisted of specialists who came from Tajikistan.
But alas, no conclusions were drawn from that accident; no clear indication of the need for mandatory ultrasonic testing of studs at all large hydroelectric power plants was formulated. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this was not done precisely in Soviet times, which are often cited as a standard for the correct attitude to security. In fact, the issue of monitoring the studs was left to the level of a specific hydroelectric power station; in some places it was done, but in others, keeping in mind the absence of instructions in the factory operating instructions for the turbines regarding the need for such control, they did not do it. This situation is one of the typical signs of the systemic nature of the accident.

In 1983, there was a flash at the Nurek hydroelectric power station. In 2009 on Sayano-Shushenskaya - no. The accident developed faster; the duty shift in the turbine room did not have time to stop the hydraulic unit and reset the valve. The shift manager died and will not tell anything.

Who is guilty?

Based on the above, I want to draw a conclusion that many will not like. I believe that the causes of the accident are not due to the criminal negligence of individuals. They are systemic in nature and have been taking shape for many years - at least since the commissioning of hydraulic unit No. 2 in 1979. The mistakes of many people, each of which was not fatal in itself, came together at one point. Some of them have already died. Those left behind will feel responsible for this tragedy for the rest of their lives. It is stupid to look for and publicly punish “scapegoats” in this situation. Although it is politically expedient. The masses need specific people who can be declared responsible for everything. And it looks like they have already been found.

The hydropower industry has gradually recovered from the shock caused by the accident. Conclusions have been drawn, and they are based on an understanding of the systemic nature of the accident. Which inspires some optimism.

The causes of the largest man-made disaster in Russian history have seemingly been established, and those responsible have been brought to justice. However, there is still an opinion that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was planned.

Multiple factor

As a rule, any man-made disaster consists of little things in which the human factor is involved, and it does not matter whether it is criminal connivance or elementary negligence. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (SSHHPP), which occurred on the morning of August 17, 2009, was no exception. Due to the release of thousands of cubic meters of water and subsequent destruction, 75 people died and another 13 were injured.

The Rostekhnadzor Commission quickly identified the causes of the accident and published the names of the people whose mistakes and miscalculations led to the tragedy. Among them are important officials: Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, General Director of OJSC TGC-1 Boris Vainzikher, as well as the former head of RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was officially put into operation in 2000: the corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais. The investigation noted that the head of RAO UES of Russia approved the Act of the Central Commission on the acceptance into operation of the SSHHPP hydropower complex “without a comprehensive assessment of the information available at that time on its functioning.”

What followed was a chain of bureaucratic abuses and violations of operating standards, which ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. As the head of Rostechnadzor Nikolai Kutin noted, the accident occurred due to a combination of various reasons: design, operational and repair.

In particular, it was found that a few hours before the accident, the second hydraulic unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station reached excessive capacity six times, and vibration during this time increased fourfold. However, no one sounded the alarm.

The main cause of the disaster was said to be tension fatigue of the fasteners (studs) of the structure of hydraulic unit No. 2, which, with increased vibration, led to their rupture and, as a consequence, to the destruction of the turbine cover and water breakthrough. Summing up the investigation, the Chairman of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician Alexander Aseev, said that the fastening studs were made of steel, “not capable of withstanding the necessary loads.”

Major disaster

To date, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is the largest disaster at a hydropower facility in Russian history. Sergei Shoigu compared this accident in its impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia with the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The accident at the SSHPP caused a great public outcry and became, perhaps, the most discussed event of 2009 in the media. In particular, many reviews from witnesses of this disaster were published.

For example, Oleg Myakishev, an employee of the SSHHPP, recalled how he heard a growing roar, and then saw how the covering of the hydraulic unit stood on end and rose. “Then I saw the rotor rising from under it. He was spinning. – Myakishev continues. “My eyes didn’t believe it.” He rose three meters. Stones and pieces of reinforcement flew, we began to dodge them. I figured: the water is rising, 380 cubic meters per second, and - I’m heading towards the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn’t make it in time.”

Raging streams of water in a matter of seconds flooded the turbine room and the rooms below it. All 10 hydraulic units were under water, after which a series of short circuits occurred that disabled the machines. Hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9 were completely destroyed; under the flow of water and flying debris of structures, the walls and ceilings of the turbine room in the area of ​​hydraulic units No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 also collapsed. The area of ​​destruction reached 1200 square meters.

Consequences

The accident at the SShHPP led to a large power shortage in the entire Siberian energy system. The supply of electricity to a number of enterprises in Kuzbass was limited; temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical enterprises, including the Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant and the West Siberian Metallurgical Plant, as well as a number of coal mines and open-pit mines.

Power engineers have seriously reduced the load on the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter and the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant and completely cut off the power at the Sayan and Khakass aluminum smelters. Less than a day after the accident, a massive death of trout began in several fishing farms located downstream of the Yenisei.

All property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for the amount of $200 million. In addition, each employee of the complex was insured by ROSNO for 500 thousand rubles. 18 dead and 1 injured were insured by Rosgosstrakh LLC, the total amount of payments exceeded 800 thousand rubles.

Property risks were also reinsured internationally, mostly by the Munich Re Group. With the German company, all disputes were resolved without any problems, but with the Swiss insurer Infrassure Ltd, litigation over payment of more than 800 million rubles dragged on for as long as 3 years.

The disaster at the SSHPP forced the authorities to monitor the condition of other water energy complexes. Thus, in the analytical note of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, which dealt with the problems of JSC RusHydro, it was noted that at many of the company’s stations “there is the operation of obsolete and physically worn-out equipment that has reached its standard service life of 25-30 years, the wear of which is almost 50% ", and "the degree of wear of certain types of hydraulic equipment - hydraulic turbines and hydraulic generators, hydraulic structures - exceeded 60% or reached a critical level."

Cyber ​​attack?

Not all of the conclusions of the commissions that investigated the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station satisfied Gennady Rassokhin, an energy engineer by profession. According to documents from Rostekhnadzor and the parliamentary commission, the main cause of the accident was metal fatigue of the studs securing the turbine cover on hydraulic unit No. 2.

However, Rassokhin asks the question why on the surfaces of broken studs there are traces of the so-called “tarnished colors”, characteristic only of “fresh” surfaces of metal breaks, and not of surfaces with a long break? Such an inconsistency may suggest a planned disaster.

At one time, Edward Snowden released materials confirming that the United States National Security Agency is in full swing preparing for future digital wars, the goal of which is complete control over the world through the Internet. In particular, it was noted that the Politerain project, run by the NSA, is creating a team of so-called “digital snipers” whose task is to disable computers that control the operation of water supply systems, power plants, factories, airports, as well as intercepting cash flows.

A blogger, a programmer and physicist by training, who introduces himself under the nickname Mr. Andrey, put forward an alternative version of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. In his opinion, the root cause of the disaster was the Stuxnet virus, which, as an element of cyber weapons, had previously been used to undermine the Russian economy.

Indeed, military analysts recognize that Stuxnet is a new milestone in the development of cyber weapons. Today it has confidently crossed the threshold of virtual space and has begun to threaten not only information objects, but also real-life objects.

Mr. Andrey describes his scenario of what happened at the SSHPP. At the moment when an accident occurred at the second hydraulic unit due to resonance, the equipment was controlled automatically, the blogger claims. Manual control for constant power delivery was disabled and the unit operated in load ripple compensation mode for the power systems of Western Siberia.

The programmer also draws attention to the fact that in March 2009, Ukrainian specialists worked at the facility and, in the process of checking the equipment (during scheduled repairs), they took the parameters of the resonant frequencies from the second unit. It is unknown where and into what hands this data fell, but one can guess, comments Mr. Andrey.

Having this data, according to the expert, it was not difficult to pump up the unit’s system through the control microcontroller so that it would gradually, over the course of several hours, “drive the turbine unit with the electric generator on the same shaft into the resonance zone.” Naturally, they didn’t think about any information security at that time, despite the fact that this system had direct access to the Internet, the blogger concludes.

Monuments have already appeared on most of the graves: someone is depicted in full growth against the backdrop of a hydroelectric power station, poems or simply the words are engraved somewhere: “Here lie a father and son, who came out for a minute, gone forever...”.

Looking at this last refuge of first-class specialists, those who are visiting this cemetery for the first time usually feel uneasy from the realization that the date of death on all the tombstones located on the large “patch” at the entrance is the same - August 17, 2009.

Uyskoe cemetery in Khakassia - almost all those who died in the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station are buried here. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

"They're all down there"

Not all relatives of those 75 people who once went to work and did not return were able to survive the loss. Now, next to the graves of those whose lives were cut short at the hydroelectric power station, mothers, fathers, children, wives, and husbands are buried. People come here every day, stand for a long time at the graves, then pray in the chapel built right there and leave silently.

One of those who forever linked their fate with the hydroelectric power station - Alexander Bezrukov, professional electric and gas welder. Ironically, he participated in its construction several decades ago. “He helped her be born, and she helped him die,” that’s what his colleagues now say about him.

His wife - Nina Bezrukova, like dozens of widows, does not like to talk to journalists. He says he doesn’t want to reopen a wound that has never healed: “What happened will never leave my memory. For two years after the accident at the hydroelectric power station, all I did was ask myself questions. Only recently did it dawn on me: this happened, you need to live with it, you need to accept it, no matter how painful it may be.”

After the tragedy, the widow of a hydroelectric power station employee, Nina Bezrukova, could not even leave the house for six months. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

She met her husband in the 70s during the construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. A graduate of the Sverdlovsk technical school came to Cheryomushki to visit her parents, and she, like many young people of that time, was drawn into the romance of the all-Union construction project.

“After I visited the station, I realized that I don’t want to leave here,” says Nina. “Soon I was hired as a welder’s assistant. I ended up in the same brigade where Sasha worked. I was 19, he was 21. Despite the fact that I was insanely shy, and he was intelligent, everything somehow gradually started to turn around. We got married, had children, and had a grandson.”

The residents of Khakassia have always been taught: the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is a reliable design, nothing can ever happen to it, because it was built with high quality, conscientiously, as they said, “for centuries.” No one living in the village of Cheryomushki, from where you can hear the water beating against the crests of the dam every second, could even imagine that anything could happen to this colossus.

“In March 2009, five months before the accident, Sasha retired,” the widow recalls. “But I was in no hurry to say goodbye to work.” I repeatedly told him: stop working, let’s start living for ourselves. But he wanted to work for another year. He had many students, his superiors consulted with him, it was considered that he had such length of service at the station!”

Now the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is almost restored, work is being carried out in several shifts. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

About three months before the accident, Nina began to be haunted by a premonition of misfortune that came from nowhere. But then she didn’t attach any importance to it:

“Very often, while working around the house, I caught myself thinking that I was burying Sasha. I drove away such “visions” from myself, but they returned. I just couldn’t understand why this came to my mind? Why did it happen? I often woke up at night and the first thing I did was check to see if my husband was alive. I look at him - he’s breathing, everything is fine, and then I fall asleep. I was constantly haunted by some kind of anxiety. No matter how hard I tried, I couldn’t get rid of it.”

Last hours

An incredibly responsible person by nature, that morning 55-year-old Alexander, perhaps, slept for the first time in many years.

“In my sleep I heard him turn off the alarm clock. Despite the fact that she herself desperately wanted to sleep, she understood that she needed to wake her up. Somehow at seven o'clock he got up and quickly got ready. Sasha kissed me, went out into the entrance and stopped. This has never happened before. He turned and began to look at me as if for the last time. I will never forget this sad, farewell look. He had such beautiful eyes: light, blue. Then I said: “Sasha, how beautiful you are.”

Closing the door behind her husband, the woman went to the kitchen to make coffee. Somewhere at 8:13 a.m. the light blinked, but she did not attach any serious importance to this fact. Soon her son called her and asked: “What happened at the hydroelectric power station?” But Nina knew nothing. She immediately looked out the window and saw dozens of townspeople running somewhere.

Residents were confident that the hydroelectric power station was a reliable structure. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

“I remember I grabbed Sasha’s driver’s license and ran outside. None of the people knew anything, everyone was hurrying up the mountain, towards the dachas. And then I meet my husband’s boss and ask: “What happened? Where is Sasha? And he answers me: “They are all down there.” I returned home, and what started here...”

For several months after the incident, Nina Bezrukova, as she now admits, was on sedatives. Months of life, but rather of existence. She, like dozens of widows, walked around like a zombie, not noticing anything around her.

“They gave us some drugs. We drank them. I didn’t leave the house for six months, I cried like a beluga. A few months later, the children began taking me to psychologists. Here, in Cheryomushki, I attended courses, and in Krasnoyarsk I saw a good specialist. They offered me to sell the apartment and leave Khakassia. But I don't want to leave this village. This is my husband's grave. No, I’m not at all afraid of living next to a hydroelectric power station—what happens, will happen. You can't escape fate. At first, when I left here somewhere far away, it was easier for me. But when I returned, I realized: this place is some kind of black hole for me. Everything that I struggled with somewhere far away came back here. This happened for two years. From constant tears I began to see poorly. Now I have to wear glasses."

Only after two years, or maybe three, she doesn’t remember exactly when, she realized that she needed to learn to live on. Psychologists advised her to take care of her family only when she has free time. And the woman listened. Now she spends a lot of time at the dacha, travels often, has passed the traffic police exam, and drives a car confidently.

“You can’t bring a person back, you need to move on with your life. The dead are gone forever. But they say they will return someday. Many young women who lost their loved ones on Sayano-Shushenskaya began life with a clean slate. I’m happy for them, besides, they need to get on their own feet and raise children. And life, no matter what, goes on.”

“There was silence in the village”

Valentina Gartseva - former kindergarten teacher— is now raising three grandchildren. Their mother is Inna Zholobova— died on the day of the accident. At the moment when the second unit failed, she was in the machine room, working as a plasterer-painter.

Valentina Gartseva took custody of three grandchildren: their mother died in the turbine room of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

“I remember this day, my daughter went to work, I was sleeping at home with the children, I heard screaming and noise on the street. I looked out the window, a man running past said: gather the kids and run to the sports complex, the hydroelectric power station has burst. Then my son came running, picked us up with the guys and took us to the dacha. I knew that my daughter was there, but I didn’t even think that she might die,” recalls Valentina Gartseva.

Information soon appeared: everything was in order with the hydroelectric dam. The family returned home. “I was busy with urgent matters; I didn’t have time to go out and listen to what they were saying. My son came, I asked why Inna didn’t call? She's always so worried about the children. He replied: Mom, Inna will never call again.”

The son took Valentina Georgievna to another apartment so as not to frighten the children. Neighbors came running and tried to calm him down. There was no hope: Inna's body was found within the first hours after the accident.

Valentina Gartseva remembers that evening: she says it was so quiet in the village, you couldn’t even hear the birds. No one really wanted to talk about what happened - this is still a topic that they try to avoid in everyday communication. The village is small, everyone knows each other, the families of the victims try not to disturb them again.

In the village of Cheryomushki they don’t like to talk about what happened in 2009. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

“Inna’s daughter found out about her mother’s death immediately. We tried to prepare the middle one, Kiryusha - he suffered a traumatic brain injury, we were afraid for the child. When Inna’s body was at our house, he was taken to the neighbors, but he ran in and saw her,” recalls Valentina. “We didn’t tell the younger one anything. Only one day at dinner, when he didn’t want to eat, I said: Mommy is looking at you from heaven, and you’re being capricious. He asked why mom was there? I answered: it happened that way. The boy didn't say anything. But at night he began to cry and scream - this happened every day for the next six months. Now he’s already big, he understands everything, he goes with us to the cemetery.”

Valentina Gartseva’s two sons still work at the hydroelectric power station. She says she never asked them to leave - work is work. “My husband and I are raising children, and gradually everything is getting better. The eldest studied with straight A's until the sixth grade, when Inna died, she dropped to only C's. Only now they have started to catch up, they listen to us well,” says Valentina. “We received compensation from the company, apartments too, they even helped with money for their repairs. We were recently taken to a sanatorium.”

The construction of the coastal spillway at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station began even before the accident, but what happened in 2009 forced power engineers to greatly accelerate. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

The trial over the accident continues, but Inna Zholobova’s family does not go there. “It’s hard for me, and I don’t understand anything about it,” explains Valentina Gartseva. - Of course, I would like the guilty to be punished. But I don’t know who is to blame, I didn’t work there, and I don’t want to judge just like that.”

She doesn’t come to the cemetery on the anniversary of the accident - she says the atmosphere is too heavy. He tries to visit often, but on other days.

Valentina Georgievna’s grandchildren may go to work at Sayano-Shushenskaya: the eldest is going to be a welder, the middle one plans to study to become a hydropower engineer, the youngest is not talking about his dreams yet.

“We heard a roar, but we thought it was necessary”

HPP employee Egor Mikerov- one of those who survived the disaster. His office was located above the turbine room, which was completely flooded at the time of the accident.

Egor Mikerov is one of the employees who survived the accident. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

Early in the morning he came to work, disarmed his office, and booted up the computer. Suddenly I heard a strange hum: at first small, then increasingly intensifying. And cotton. “After the clap, they turned off the lights,” says Yegor. — My office is on the ground floor and is closest to the machine room. A stream of water, a huge stream, poured into the corridor. I realized that I wouldn’t make it to the emergency exit at the end of the corridor - I have cerebral palsy, I’m disabled since childhood,” says Egor. — I closed the door and climbed out through the window onto the street, there were already streams gushing out of two doors, the water was about knee-deep. A woman jumped out of a neighboring building, together with her we slowly walked to the checkpoint, the water kept rising, but we managed to cling to some kind of visor. Then the guys came running and pulled me out. They put me in a car and sent me home.”

Yegor recalls: the worst thing was the craters that formed over the open basements; office furniture and iron safes were sucked in there; even a person could easily be sucked in. A couple of times the craters were only a couple of meters from Yegor, but luckily we managed to get around them.

Eyewitnesses recall that at first the noise did not cause concern. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

Almost no one understood what happened; there was a guess that the sixth unit had broken down, because it was planned to be launched on that very day. Therefore, the resulting vibration did not surprise anyone. A hum during startup is normal. Only when the noise began to grow did they realize that something had gone wrong.

Egor recalls: many employees arrived at the hydroelectric power station two hours after the accident: people were returning from vacation, coming from other cities. Cellular communication stopped working within the first hour - it could not withstand the overload. No one was called, but everyone rushed to the hydroelectric power station.

“It was absolutely obvious that only the Ministry of Emergency Situations could not cope, this is impossible, no matter how many people they had, so everyone who could helped,” says Yegor. “I miraculously managed to get through to my father and mother and said: pack your things, I thought there would be an evacuation.” In the morning there was a terrible fog, the body of the dam was almost invisible, there were fears that something had happened to it. Then I realized that it was intact - otherwise stones and boulders would have started falling from the mountains.”

Ambulances drove along the street every now and then. The village was empty - everyone went to the station. A search began for the victims, which lasted more than a month. Yegor says he lost hope much earlier: “My relatives believed until the last moment, but I knew that if people were not found in the first 24 hours, it would be almost impossible to save them: a person would hardly survive in the water for more than 24 hours.”

Sayano-Shushinskaya hydroelectric power station. Photo: AiF / Lyudmila Alekseeva

Yegor does not like to overdramatize what happened: “Yes, 75 people died (we count among ourselves - 76, one girl was pregnant and was about to go on maternity leave). All this incredible grief. But how many people were saved after all?”

A month later, drying and repairs began in the premises. The hydroelectric power station gradually began to be restored, people returned to their offices and began to carry out their direct duties.

Soon Yegor got married and had a daughter: “I can’t say that at that moment I went through some kind of colossal stress, I couldn’t recover for a long time - you see, I’m disabled, I’ve gotten used to stress since childhood, maybe that’s why I quickly came to myself, I don’t complain about anything. The village is small, and we go through all these troubles together. But life goes on, the city lives its own life. We remember the dead."

The capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is the largest in Russia. She is also the sixth largest in the world. The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is located in Khakassia, on the Yenisei River, not far from Sayanogorsk.

Composition of station structures

The main object of the station is an arched gravity dam made of concrete, which has a height of 245 meters and a length of 1066 meters. The width of the dam at the base is 110 meters, and at the crest 25 meters. The dam can be divided into four parts. The left-bank and right-bank blind parts are 246 m and 298 m long, respectively, the drainage part is 190 meters long, and the station part is 332 meters long.

Adjacent to the dam is the hydroelectric power station building near the dam.

Tourism

The station itself and its turbine hall are interesting as tourist sites. The power plant also has its own museum. Since the site is sensitive, it can only be visited through regional tour operators.

The area where the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station is located (the map is located below) is a place that has gained popularity among tourists. Previously, there was even a special observation deck from which one could best see the station. Now in this place, next to the dam, a memorial dedicated to the builders of the hydroelectric power station has been erected. On the banks of the Yenisei rises the five-domed peak Borus, which is considered a national shrine among the Khakassians, as is the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The map of Khakassia allows you to better find out where these places are located.

The observation deck on the left bank allows you to see a white rock two hundred meters high. It represents part of the Kibik-Kordon marble deposit, which occupies several kilometers of the Yenisei bank. One of the parts of the road leading from Sayanogorsk to Cheryomushki lies directly along the marble deposit. Its construction was hampered by difficult geological conditions and rocky spurs, which made its construction one of the most expensive in the world.

Construction

The final decision to begin construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was made in 1962. Construction began in 1968. In 1975, during the construction of a hydroelectric power station, the bed of the Yenisei River was blocked, and already in 1978, with the launch of the first hydraulic unit, the station produced its first current. From 1979 to 1985, nine more hydraulic units were launched successively. In 1988, construction of the station was largely completed. In 2005, work began on the construction of a coastal spillway, which should increase the reliability of the station. In 2011, the spillway was put into operation.

Exploitation

In 2006, serious deficiencies were discovered in the plant's turbine room and drainage well. In 2007, a routine inspection revealed significant wear and tear on the booms, which were 20 years old. The design of the hydraulic units with which the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was equipped turned out to be not very successful, prone to increased formation of cracks. Photos published after the accident made it possible to judge the extent of their destruction.

A large program of modernization and technical re-equipment of the station was developed, the implementation of which began, but the accident at the power plant made adjustments to the plans of the builders.

Accident

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, the accident at which occurred on August 17, 2009, caused great destruction.

In the morning in August 2009, an accident occurred at the hydroelectric power station. The second hydraulic unit was destroyed, and the turbine room was flooded with a large amount of water. The 7th and 9th hydraulic units were severely damaged, the third, fourth and fifth hydraulic units were covered with debris. This led to the destruction of the turbine hall from which the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was controlled. The accident resulted in the death of 75 people.

The tragedy was thoroughly investigated. The investigation report was published in October 2009.

Recovery

New hydraulic units to replace the damaged ones were ordered to the Power Machines enterprise. Already in 2010, units No. 6, No. 5, No. 4 and No. 3 were in operation, which made it possible to increase the power of the station to 2560 MW - 40% of the nominal one. In parallel, work was carried out on the dismantling of unit No. 2 and the construction of a coastal spillway, which ended with successful hydraulic tests. The station generated 10 billion kWh of electricity.

Thus, the first stage of reconstruction was completed, as a result of which four hydraulic units of the station, which suffered the least damage, were put into operation.

In 2011, the second stage of reconstruction began. The construction of the second stage of the spillway was completed, and by the end of the year the entire spillway complex was put into operation.

In addition, a new hydraulic unit (No. 1) was put into operation.

Electricity generation in 2011 amounted to more than 18 billion kWh.
In 2012, three new hydroelectric units were launched: No. 7, No. 8, No. 9, after which the capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP amounted to 3840 MW.

In 2013, three new hydraulic units were launched: No. 10, No. 6, No. 5, which made it possible to increase the station’s capacity to 4,480 MW.

In 2013, the station produced more than 24 billion kWh.

In 2014, the third stage of station reconstruction began. As part of its implementation, in 2014, hydraulic unit No. 4 produced current.

At the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, a complete re-equipment was carried out with new hydraulic units of OJSC Power Machines, which have the best parameters and meet stringent safety and reliability requirements. The capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station became equal to the nominal - 6400 MW. The maximum efficiency of the new hydraulic turbines reached 96.6%, and the maximum service life of the machines was increased to 40 years. Now the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, the photos of which immediately after the accident and today are strikingly different, is operating at full capacity.

The Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex is located on the Yenisei River in the southeast of the Republic of Khakassia in the Sayan Canyon at the river’s exit into the Minusinsk Basin. The complex includes the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, as well as the downstream counter-regulatory Mainsky hydroelectric complex and the coastal spillway.

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after. P.S. Neporozhniy (SSHPP) is a branch of the Russian energy holding RusHydro.

The hydroelectric power station building houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 megawatts each.

Before the accident on August 17, 2009, the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was the most powerful source of covering peak loads in the Unified Energy System of Russia and Siberia. The main consumers of electricity from the SSHHPP were the Sayanogorsk Aluminum Smelter, the Khakass Aluminum Smelter, the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter, the Novokuznetsk Aluminum Smelter, and the Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Smelter.

On August 17, 2009, at 08.15 (04.15 Moscow time), due to the destruction of fastening elements, an accident occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station; the flow of water tore off the cover of the second hydraulic unit into the turbine room. Repair shops with people inside were flooded. The accident killed 75 people.

At the time of the accident, nine hydraulic units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was in reserve). The total active power of the operating units was 4400 megawatts. The release of water from the crater of the turbine of the second hydraulic unit led to the partial collapse of building structures in the area from the first to the fifth hydraulic units; the load-bearing columns of the building were damaged and in some places destroyed, as well as the equipment for the regulation and control systems of hydraulic units; five phases of power transformers received mechanical damage of varying degrees; the building structures of the transformer site in the area of ​​the first and second blocks were damaged.

All ten units of the SSHHPP were damaged or completely destroyed, and more than 40 tons of engine oil spilled into the Yenisei waters.

As a result of the accident, the production levels located below the machine room were flooded. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the hydroelectric power station, including for its own needs.

The area adjacent to the power plant was also under water. However, flooding of populated areas is still

The accident did not affect the condition of the SSHHPP dam.

At 09.20 (05.20 Moscow time), the emergency repair valves of the hydraulic units were closed by the plant personnel and contractors and the flow of water into the turbine room was stopped.

In the destroyed and flooded premises of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Emergency restoration work began in the machine room where the technological accident occurred. 115 people were involved, of which 98 people were personnel of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations in Khakassia (firefighters, rescuers, operational teams) and 21 pieces of equipment.

An oil slick, formed as a result of a transformer oil leak, five kilometers downstream of the Yenisei.

At 11.40 (06.40 Moscow time) the gates of the spillway dam were opened and the balance of flow through the waterworks was restored. Before the opening of the spillway dam gates, the regulation of sanitary release along the Yenisei River was carried out by the Mainskaya HPP.

Due to the accident at the SShHPP in the Siberian energy system. Energy workers were forced to work at a number of Kuzbass enterprises. In particular, temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical plants owned by the Evraz Group - the Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant (NKMK) and the West Siberian Metallurgical Plant (ZapSib), a number of coal mines and open-pit mines.

The Sayan and Khakass aluminum smelters were shut down, the load on the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter and the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant was reduced (load reduction by 150 megawatts),

At 21.10 Moscow time, during a conference call at the crisis center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, it was reported that there were 10 dead, 11 wounded, the fate of 72 people was being clarified. The rubble has been cleared and the power supply system is being restored.

Less than a day after the accident in two fish farms located downstream of the Yenisei hydroelectric power station in the village of Maina, due to engine oil from destroyed hydraulic units entering the Yenisei. About 400 tons of commercial trout died. In the Yenisei, the fish migrated, moved away from the spot, and therefore did not die, but in trout farms they were in pontoons, they had no opportunity to leave.

During the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the station by the forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy of Russia, during emergency rescue operations in general, up to 2.7 thousand people were involved (including about 2 thousand people directly at the hydroelectric power station), more than 200 pieces of equipment, including including 11 aircraft and 15 watercraft. More than 5 thousand cubic meters of rubble were cleared, more than 277 thousand cubic meters of water were pumped out. 9683 meters of booms were installed, 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

To coordinate the interaction of the involved organizations during the period of emergency rescue operations, and in the future to promptly resolve issues of restoration of the hydroelectric power station, an operational headquarters of the Russian Ministry of Energy, headed by the Deputy Minister of Energy, was created at the station.

Project for the restoration and comprehensive reconstruction of the SSHHPP. According to the plan approved by the Russian Ministry of Energy, the hydroelectric power station should be completely restored in 2014.

In July 2013, the third hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, which is one of the four units least damaged in the 2009 man-made accident, was stopped for reconstruction. By this time, the remaining nine units had already been reconstructed. Third hydraulic unit according to plan

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources